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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 20050676-SC

EDGAR TIEDEMANN,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant is charged with three counts of murder, a first degree felony. This Court
granted defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal from pretrial orders denying his motions
to suppress his confession and to dismiss for destruction of evidence. This Court has
appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress his
confession where police used no coercive tactics, defendant appeared to be sober and lucid,
and defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to silence?
Standard of Review: A bifurcated standard of review applies to a trial court's
determination of the voluntariness of a confession. State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f 10,
984 P.2d 1009. "The ultimate determination of voluntariness is a legal question," which is

reviewed "for correctness." Id But a district court's factual findings are set aside "only if
they are clearly erroneous." Id,
Issue No. 2: Were defendant's due process rights violated by the destruction of
physical evidence, where defendant has not shown that the police acted in bad faith in
destroying the evidence and where other ample evidence in the form of eyewitnesses and
written reports remains?
Standard ofReview: u[W]hether specific police conduct rises to the level of bad faith
is a question of law, reviewed under a correctness standard." State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318,
324 (Utah App. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions are reproduced in Addendum A: U.S. Const,
amends. V, VI, & XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In November 1991, defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated murder, a
capital offense, and one count each of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated kidnapping,
and aggravated sexual assault, first degree felonies. R477. The charges were dismissed
seven months later, on June 11, 1992, after alienists concluded that defendant was
incompetent to stand trial and would remain so "in the foreseeable future." R636:13; R531 33. Defendant was civilly committed to the Utah State Hospital. R636:18. A doctor at the
State Hospital later opined that defendant would never become competent or be able to assist
in his defense. R636:15.
2

In April 1994, the evidence custodian notified the investigating officer that physical
evidence taken from defendant's person and from the crime scene would be destroyed, unless
an objection were lodged within 30 days. See Supplemental Record (Addendum B). No
objection was made and two revolvers were destroyed eight months later on December 16,
1994. Id. However, according to the West Valley Police Property Tracking Tags, several
other items had already been destroyed on February 22, 1994, including a Code R kit, a
victim's wallet, heroin, an audio tape, a blood specimen, a make-up kit, drug paraphernalia,
various articles of the victims' clothing, bedding, a bone fragment found on one victim's bed,
a bottle with green liquid, a one gallon can of Toluene, .38 and .22 caliber bullets, bullet
fragments, shell casings, hair and saliva samples, and gunshot residue from defendant and
the surviving victim.1 Id.
In January 1998, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office sent a letter to the State
Hospital, explaining that it did not intend to pursue the originally-filed criminal charges
against defendant and that it would support the Hospital's decision to place defendant on
"less restrictive housing and treatment." R558. In October 2002, the district attorney's
office received word that defendant was about to be released from civil commitment because
he was "no longer psychotic." R562-63.

]

Not all evidence was destroyed. The following evidence was preserved and given
to the defense: autopsy photos and reports of all three victims; toxicology reports on the
victims; a rape report by St. Mark's Hospital; photos taken of weapons and ammunition;
firearm analysis reports; transcripts of interviews taken from one of the shooting victims
and the sexual assault victim; witness statements; a videotape of the interview of the
sexual assault victim; and a videotape and photos of the crime scene. R60-61.
3

The State recharged defendant on November 13, 2002, with three counts of murder,
first degree felonies.2 Rl-5; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004). The State did not
refile the other felony counts. Id. Defendant was bound over as charged after a preliminary
hearing. R99; R630:5 et seq.; R632:2. After holding a hearing, the trial court found
defendant competent to stand trial. R638:43.
Defendant moved to suppress the confession he gave police the day after the murders.
R246-67. He also moved to dismiss the charges based on the State's destruction of physical
evidence. R388-403. The trial court denied both motions. R585-95;R599-606. This Court
granted defendant's timely petition for interlocutory appeal from both rulings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
On November 1,1991, defendant shot three people: Susie Sessions; her 14-year-old
son, Scotty Bunnel; and Chuck Timberman. R630:15-10.25-30. Defendant then raped
Susie's sister at gunpoint. R630:25-27. Susie and Chuck died that night. R630:19, 25, 3031. Scotty survived, but lived the next ten years as a paraplegic. He died in 2001 from
complications of the paraplegia caused by the gunshot wounds. State's Preliminary Hearing
Exhibit #11, in manila envelope marked "Exhibits."

2

The victim of defendant's attempted murder had since died.

3

Because defendant has not yet been convicted, he is still entitled to the
presumption of innocence. Nevertheless, the following facts, taken from the preliminary
hearing, are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's rulings. See State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Utah 1996).
4

"(PJlay deadj please, please"
Susie Sessions and her sister Debrah Southerland had known defendant for about
thirteen years. R 630:39, On Friday, November 1, 1991, Susie-and her son Scotty were
moving oi it of their apartment; Debrah andhei bo> fi iei id, Chuck, v • ei emo\ ing to Phoenix.
R630:7-8.. Debrah was pregnant with Chuck's child. R630:8. The foi u: planned to spend
that night in a motel, but defendant invited them to "come stay at his trailer." R630:9. They
accepted and drove over in two cars, packed with all their belongings. R630:9-10.
Susie and Debrah made dinner. R 630:

\fter dinner, 1:1 v; .• w atched television

together. R630:13. At about 10:30 p.m., defendant retired to his bedroom. Id. Becailse of
a strong "glue smell," Debrah suspected that defendant was sniffing an inhalant. Id.
Susie, Scotty, Debrah, and Chuck went to bed around 12:30 a.m. R630:14-15. Susie
and Scotty slept ii i the li\ ing room, w ith Si isie on the coi id I ai id Scotty 1> ing iieai 1:>> on tl le
floor on some cushions. Id. Debrah and Chuck slept on a mattress in a second bedroom.
Debrah and Chuck had "just fallen asleep when [they] heard . . . a pop, a real loud
pop"c. ii-cig IH •;.. -.. front room.

:

."

* ! \KK ' K\ \\ pet I, ;\ ' exclaiming, "What the

*

f*** was that." R630:l 7. I he door to the bedroom slid opei I and Debrah saw defei idai it
"standing in the doorway with a gun. You could see the light from the hallway through his
glasses. And I s e e n . . . him shoot the gun, the fire come out of the gun with the smoke." Id.
Chi ick fell back < )i 11 he 1 >ed next t< > Del >ral I. R630:18 Chuck told Debrah to "play
dead." R630:18. Debrah heard two more shots from the front re :>ITI, She start .ed to get up,
but Chuck put his arm on her and pleaded, "play dead, please, please." Id.
5

Defendant reappeared in the bedroom doorway. He fired two more shots. Id.
Chuck's body jerked. Chuck told Debrah that he could not move. Id. Debrah heard two
more shots from the living room. Id.
"[PJlease don H shoot me, I'm already paralyzed."
Debrah "played dead" for the next two hours while defendant "went from one room
to the other back and forth." R630:18. A "good 10 times," defendant came to Debrah's
bedroom and "slid[] the door open, turn[ed] on the light and look[ed], turn[ed] the light off
and shut the door" before "going back" to the front room. R630:19.
In the meantime, Chuck died. R630:19. He "had like the death rattle." R630:20.
"He was trying to breathe and couldn't breathe and all of the sudden he was quiet." Id.
It was quiet for a long time before Debrah heard her nephew Scotty say, "Please don't
shoot me, please don't shoot me, I'm already paralyzed." R630:19. Debrah heard defendant
reply, "I'll try not to." Id.
"There was blood everywhere."
The sun was coming up when defendant returned to the bedroom and told Debrah "to
get up." Id. When Debrah just lay there, defendant said, "I know you're not dead, get up."
Id. Debrah pulled the covers from her head to see defendant pointing a handgun at her. Id.
After convincing defendant to lower the gun, Debrah, naked, stood up and put on her robe.
R630:21. Afraid to turn her back to defendant, Debrah walked backwards down the hall to
the living room. Id. Defendant followed with the gun "by his side." Id.

6

In the living room, defendant ordered Debrah to sii »|nv u She started In Ml on a i, h*ii ••.
but the cushions were gone, causing her to get back up. Id. Startled, defendant again pointed
the gun at Debrah. Id, Debrah put one hand on the gun while she begged defendant to lower
it because he wa s "scaring" hei, hi 1 )eleinkinl reached into his pocket to pull out another
gun. R630:21-22. . Debrah reached for the second gi in with her other hand , bi it tl len
defendant promised not to shoot and he put both guns down. Id.
Defendant handed Debrah a cigarette. R630:22. Susie's body, covered by a blanket,
was hing on Ihe i I'liili Kh3(i\\S SentU

iillc--:- - ..

- .- ; in e on the cushions on the

floor. R630:22, 30. He had three bullet holes, one 111 hi* IVJ! ? - k Ro v(); u\

11^ e\e

was messed up, where the bullet went in." Id. He also had a bullet wound in his right
forearm. R630:30-31. "Ihere was blood everywhere" around Scotty. R630:31. His
blankets, pillow , an ;:i 1:1 leci ishions • v sre "all covered in blood " R 630:31,22 Scotty's "legs
were bended a little bit and he was like not completely on his she 1 llder, like halfwa y on his
shoulder." R630:22.
Scotty asked Debrah for some water. R630:22. With defendant's permission, Debrah
got him some, R 630:22-23. Scot"' • asked Debrah to mo v e him because I lis shoulder hurt.
But Debrah "just fixed the cushion, didn't move him because he was paralyzed" and she was
"scared he was going to get worse." R630:23. Debrah straightened out Scotty's legs, but
. ;' •'

Scotty "'(in! "In: eouhin 1 (eel llliem)."' /0'

7

'••'•-

"Why did you shoot my mom?"
Debrah sat with defendant and Scotty in the living room for a couple of hours.
R630:24. Defendant was sniffing something that smelled like glue out of a glass jug. Id.
At one point, defendant pulled the blanket off Susie's face and asked, "Isn't she pretty now?"
R630:25. Debrah saw that Susie had been shot in the face. "Her eye was gone." Id.
Scotty asked defendant, "Why did you shoot my mom?" R630:37. Defendant said
that "she didn't love him, that if she would have just kissed him the night before it would be
all right." R630:37. Defendant said "he killed Chuck because Chuck was going to beat him
up for killing Susie." Id. When Scotty asked why he shot him, defendant replied, "cause
you'd tell on me. And Scotty says no, I wouldn't tell on you. I'm scared of you." R630:37.
Defendant replied, "you are now." R630:37.
Debrah asked defendant "why he didn't shoot [her]." He replied, "you didn't, you
haven't done nothing to me. And I can be a better father to that baby than Chuck can." Id.
«[N]ot in front of Scotty"
Eventually, defendant ordered Debrah to "drop [her] robe." R630:25. Debrah said
she would, "but not in front of Scotty." Id. Defendant said "he was going to f* * * [her] dead
or alive" and ordered her down the hallway. R630:26. Defendant, guns in hand, told Debrah
to stop in the middle of the hallway and to drop her robe. Id. He "took down his pants, told
[Debrah] to lay down and then he got on [her]." Id. Defendant held "the gun to [her]
temple" while he raped her. R630:26-27. After "climax[ing]," he got off. Debrah "looked

8

over towards the, bedroom" and saw "Chuck laying on the mattress." R63027

I le v\ us

"already turning gray." Defendant said this was "his best love making he ever had." Id.
"[IJfyou say anything Pm going to do both barrels into you

"

Defendant let Debrah dress inthebedroon 1. R 630:28-29 I hey tl lenreti ii nedto the
front room where defendant "started . . . nodding out." Defendant wanted Debrah "to go
with him in his bedroom and get between the wall and the mattress so he could go to sleep."
Debrah refused because "it was like me putting myself in a coffin. I just couldn't do it." Id.
Debrah instead offered to get del en dan I cocaine

. 'ah told defendant that ^hc

only had to make a phone call. Id. When defendant said he did not have a phone, Debrah
pointed out "that 7-11 was just down the street." Id. Defendant agreed to go and had Debrah
drive -. N .,u. i\n;u,^,
Upon reaching -:

Defendant took his two guns with him. R630:32.
• -• • approached the pay phone w here Debrah dialed a

random number and pretended to talk to her drug dealer. As they returned to the car, Debrah
asked if she could buy a drink. R630:30-32. After looking inside the store, defendant said,
"Yeah, if you say any thing I'm going to do both barrels into you and [the lady cashier]."
R630:32-33. Because defendant had alread\ killed (wo people, Debrah decided nni i.

u

inside. Debrah and defendant instead bought sodas at a drive-thru fast food restaurant. Id.
"And that's when I started crying..

"

Debrah then dro^ - e to a gas station in I\ lidvale tlia t had a pay phone that she could
drive up to. R630:33. She hoped that if she could p

-^ n ^ J

/Vfen ! -

stay in the car while she got out to make another phone call. Id. Debrah's plan worked and
9

she called Susie's friend Pat and arranged to immediately go to her house. Id.
Debrah then told defendant that he could not go with her because "they won't sell me
anything." R630:33-34. At first, defendant told Debrah to "forget it." R630:34. Debrah
replied, "Fine, it's right there if you want it." Id. Defendant asked how long it would take
her. Id. Debrah said, "Five minutes. You can watch me. It's right there around the corner."
Id. Defendant relented and got out of the car with his two handguns. Id.
Debrah drove a few blocks to Pat's house where she told Pat to "dial 911" because
"Chuck's dead, Susie's dead and Scotty's paralyzed and he's bleeding to death." Id.
Responding officers asked Debrah to go with them to identify defendant. R630:34-35.
Debrah resisted because defendant "swore it'd be both barrels in me," but finally agreed. Id.
Debrah saw defendant from an unmarked police car walking down the street.
R630:35-36. Debrah "hollered to the cops, there he is" and lay down in the seat. "And that's
when I started crying." Debrah "heard the cops say he's drawing, he's drawing. And [she]
heard on the speaker, the cop says, drop it or we'll drop you." Id. When Debrah finally
looked, defendant was down on the ground and police had taken two guns from him. Id.
After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant confessed to the shootings that afternoon.
See Transcript of Interview with Defendant (Addendum C) [hereafter "T" followed by page
number]. He also admitted to having intercourse with Debrah, but claimed that it was
consensual and that she had said "it was real enjoyable." T:22.
Additional relevant facts are contained in the argument section.

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: "[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is m* * oluntary'" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 I i.S I N> " 11 h 1 I I {)Kb), I he li'uil court here lounil no evidence of any coercive
police tactics in obtaining defendant's confession, which was made only four minutes after
Miranda warnings. Defendant has not shown that finding to be clearly erroneous. Absent
any evidence of police coercion, defendant's alleged mental condition and intoxication did
noi iviiiki liis confession eonstiiutioiiiill) nisnluntan, Defendant's waiver of his Miranda
rights was likewise knowing and voluntary, where police used no coervh e tactics lo ohkuii
the waiver and where defendant appear lucid and responsive. Finally, defendant did not
unequivocally invoke his right to silence when he said two minutes after waiving Miranda,
"I tlt'ii'l want to talk alioyl,'" In rontext, it is clear that defendant was referring to Susie's
injuries and that he was not attempting to terminate tl le ii iterv iew.
Point II: Defendant argues that the police destruction of physical evidence violated
his federal and state due process rights. Because defendant claims that the destroyed
evidence was on!> potentially i lseful, he cai 1 prevail oi: i -1 ^ federal claim only if he shows that
the police acted in bad faith. Defendant has not made the reqi lisite showing of bad fa ith.
This Court should decline to consider defendant's proposed state constitutional analysis
because lie did not present that claim to the trial court. Should this Court nevertheless
consider defendant''s state constitutional clain 1, it should adopt the well-reasoned federal
standard. In any case, defendant cannot and has not shown a violation of slate dm process.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT5 S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS HIS CONFESSION, WHERE POLICE USED NO
COERCIVE TACTICS, DEFENDANT APPEARED SOBER AND
LUCID, AND DEFENDANT DID NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY INVOKE
HIS RIGHT TO SILENCE
Defendant argues that his confession should be suppressed for three reasons: (1) his
confession was involuntary under the federal constitution (Br. Aplt. 15-27); (2) his waiver
of Miranda rights was not knowing or voluntary (id); and (3) he unequivocally invoked his
right to silence before confessing (id. at 27-34).4 As explained below, the trial court properly
found that defendant's confession was not involuntary under the federal constitution because
the police employed no coercive tactics. The record refutes defendant's claims that his
waiver of Miranda rights was not knowing or voluntary or that he unequivocally invoked his
right to silence.
A.

The confession.
Detective Edwards and Sergeant Spann of the West Valley Police Department

interviewed defendant at the police station the afternoon of November 2,1991, the same day
defendant was arrested. R630:35; Add. C. They videotaped the interview.5 The videotape

4

Defendant treats the first two issues together. This brief, however, will treat them
separately because while the same constitutional standard applies to the voluntariness of
both a confession and a waiver, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986),
the factual inquiry is distinct. It is possible to have a voluntary confession, but an
involuntary waiver and vice versa.
5

The videotape is with the transcript in an envelope marked R611. For the
convenience of the Court, citations to the videotape will be to "VT" followed by the
12

begins at 1:58 p.m. VT:1:58. It shows defendant seated behind i\ l.ible with his hands
cuffed in front of him. Id. Detective Edwards is seated on the opposite side of the table with
his side to the camera, while Sergeant Spann is seated to defendant's left, off camera. Id.
..

;L\ jnuuLi ;s looking down at his hands, but he

looks up when one of the officers asks him to sign a coi isent form to search 1 lis ti ailei
VT:1:58; T:3. Defendant immediately responds by moving forward, taking a pen, and
signing the document. VT: 1:58. While defendant is so engaged, the other officer asks if he
is signing the-

A\

:

. CMU.-H , > \ ^ h

^t

.,

\> defendant continues to

sign, the first officer states that defendant has aclr-^ . >h d h - • h^ md said lh.il he is i i-l
intoxicated with alcohol. Id. Defendant interrupts and states that he is intoxicated with
Toluene, which he has been using since 1962. Id. One of the officers asks if defendant is
incapable nf understaiulim? Ji'nl answering questions

1 iefendant replies, "Sometimes. I

don't know." The officer then asks, "Do y oi 11 mdersta: •• •*•>* difference between right and
wrong right now?" Defendant answers, "I do now. I didn't then." Id. Throughout this
initial exchange, defendant is engaged and makes eye contact with the two officers. Id.
The officers then i noved the table, shifted defendant's chair, and appeared to leave the
room. Defendant remained seated and again looked down at his hands, LI \ccnvding lo the
time stamp on the videotape, the camera was turned off at 2:01 p.m. These first three
minutes are not transcribed.
I he camera wns tnrnnl hurls MM ,il 1I" I \ \\ in
applicable timestamp on the tape, thus: VT: 1:158.
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I his is w lucre Ihe transcript u ;;ie

interview begins. See T:l. When the camera came back on, defendant was in the same
position as before, seated behind the table, with his head lowered, looking down. The
officers returned and resumed their former positions. VT:2:13.
One of the officers asked defendant to lookup a little bit. Defendant did not move
or respond. Id. After announcing the date and time, Detective Edwards stated, "I have to
read you your rights per [MJiranda. Do you understand that?" T:l. Defendant replied,
"Ya." Id. Detective Edwards then reviewed each individual right, asked defendant if he
understood, and paused while defendant responded affirmatively6:
RE:

D:
RE:
D:
RE:
D:
RE:
D:

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be
used against you in a court of law. You have the right to have a lawyer
present before any questioning. Do you understand that?
. . . inaudible .. .7
Do you understand that you can stop this questioning at anytime?
Ya.
If you cannot afford an attorney, we will provide one for you. Do you
understand that?
Ya.
Do you still wish to speak to us at this time?
Ya.

T: 1. Detective Edwards next asked defendant if he was intoxicated. Defendant responded,
"On [TJoluene." Id. Defendant explained that Toluene is a paint thinner. Id. Detective
Edwards then asked:
RE:
D:

6

Okay, do you know why we're going to talk to you?
Ya.

"RE" is Detective Edwards; "ES" is Sergeant Spann; and "D" is defendant.

7

Although the transcript says "inaudible" here, defendant can be heard to say
"Ya," at this point on the videotape. VT:2:14.
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RE:
D:
RE:
D:
RE:
D:
RE:
D:
RE:

What are we going to talk to you about?
The murders out there.
What murders?
The murders out there at West Valley.
Who are they?
Suzie, Chuck and Scotty.
Whose Suzie?
She's the woman I love.
That you love?

T:l-2. Defendant started crying at this point. Detective Edwards asked what happened to
Suzie and defendant replied:
D:
RE:
D:

I don't want to talk about it.
You don't want to talk about it?
No.

T:2. Sergeant Spann then asked:
ES:
D:
ES:
D:

Edgar?
What.
Why don't you want to talk about it?
I love that woman so much.

T:2. At this point, less than two minutes had elapsed since defendant waived his Miranda
rights. VT:2:15. Throughout this interchange, defendant cried and looked down.
After a short pause, Sergeant Spann asked, "What is it that you don't want to talk
about?" VT:2:15. After another short pause, during which defendant continued to softly cry,
Sergeant Spann said, "You said murders in West Valley, where in West Valley." Id.
Defendant responded with his address. T:2. Detective Edwards then asked who lived with
defendant. Id. Defendant replied that Suzie and Scotty had just moved in the night before.
Id. This exchange immediately followed:
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RE:
ES:

D:
ES:
D:
ES:

Okay, what don't you want to talk about? Edgar? What don't you want
to talk about, Ed?8
Edgar, we're not going to force you [to] talk about anything. We're
asking you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer[]
[his] questions, not answer that question, answer this question, not
answer that question. You don't have to answer any of our questions
at all. You can stop at anytime.
Okay.
He made that clear to you, right?
Ya.
Okay. You stated you wanted to talk to us, what part do you and what
part don't you want to talk to us about?

T:3. At this point, only three minutes had passed since defendant waived his Miranda rights
and said he wanted to talk to police. VT:2:16. When defendant did not immediately
respond, Detective Edwards asked, "Edgar do you remember me reading you[r] rights earlier
and you signing a waiver for us to search your home?" When defendant acknowledged this,
Detective Edwards explained that they found the victims there. He then asked, "Who shot
them?" Defendant replied, "Me." T:3; VT:2:17. Defendant's confession came only four
minutes after the interview began. Id.
Defendant then explained that he shot Suzie because he loved her and that he shot
Chuck "[j]ust to cover up the murder." T:3-4; VT:2:17. Defendant told police that he shot
Suzie first and that he used a .22 and a .38 in the shootings. T:5-6. He explained where he
kept his guns. T:6. Defendant's account of the shootings was consistent with Debrah's
preliminary hearing testimony. For example, he said he shot Susie and Scotty first, and then
Chuck. T:6, 10-11. He also talked about going back and forth between rooms and turning

8

On the videotape, defendant appears to be crying here. VT:2:16.
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Debrah's bedroom light on and off. Till He acknowledged having sex with Debrah after
the shootings, but claimed it was consensual. T:22. He confirmed that Debrah had promised
to get him cocaine. T:20.
Although defendant could not remember the day of the week or whether the victims
had moved in during the day or night, T:4, defendant was able to give several complex and
detailed answers to the questions put to him. For example, he gave police his license plate
number and the make of his car, T:4, Susie's former address, T:9, the month and year he had
suffered a stroke, T:8-9, details about his physical condition, T:8-9, the month and year he
began receiving SSI, T:8, and a list of grievances he had against Susie. T:7,9-10,16-17.
All of defendant's answers were responsive to the questions put to him and many of
them volunteered details. See, e.g., T:8, 14, 16, 17, 23, 27. However, while almost all of
defendant's answers were rational, two arguably were not:
RE:
D:
RE:
D:

Okay. Is there any mental problems?
Ya. All kinds.
What kind of mental problems?
See, I think I'm Adolf Hitler. Adolf Hitler died in May of 1945 and I
was born in 19, October 1946. I think I'm Adolf Hitler.

T:9. Defendant started to cry again during the last sentence. VT:2:24. Later in the
interview, defendant said he did not know why he shot the victims and that the devil told him
to do it:
RE:
D:
RE:
D:

When you was in the back bedroom, Edgar, with the gun, why did you
have to go out and shoot them?
I don't have any idea.
Did you hear any voices?
I think so. I don't know.
17

RE:
D:

Who was telling you to go shoot them?
The devil.

T:13-14.
Although defendant's head was lowered and he looked down through almost the entire
interview, he was alert and responsive. Several times during the interview, defendant raised
his hands to adjust his glasses or scratch his head. E.g., VT:2:19; 2:22-25; 2:28; 2:32; 2:34;
2:38; 2:39-41. He often shook his head while answering questions. E.g., VT:2:26; 2:28-29;
2:31-32; 2:35; 2:37. At one point, he showed the officers how he shot the victims by placing
his hands together and pointing. VT:2:51. At the officers' request he stood to repeat the
demonstration. VT:2:51-52. He had no difficulty standing and while he limped slightly
when he sat back down, he explained that this was from an earlier stroke. VT:2:52.
Defendant's speech was neither slurred nor abnormally slow. See generally VT.
The interview lasted less than an hour, from 2:13 p.m. to 2:59 p.m. See VT.
B.

A confession is involuntary under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
only if it is the product of coercive police activity.
Defendant argues that his confession was involuntary under the federal constitution

because he was incapable of answering questions at the time. He claims that the officers
knew of his "long-term substance abuse and intoxication," but "made no effort to resolve
those matters or his inability to understand and answer questions for a clear, unequivocal,
voluntary waiver and confession." Br. Aplt. 27. "That," according to defendant, "constitutes
coercion." Id. Defendant's argument contradicts controlling law.
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall
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'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.'" Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,163 (1986). Under the Due Process Clause, "'certain interrogation
techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular
suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.'" Id.
(quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)). The Fifth Amendment similarly
"'protects individuals from being compelled to give evidence against themselves.'" State v.
Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f 11, 984 P.2d 1009 (citations omitted).
Thus, "whether admission of a confession into evidence violates the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment does not turn solely on the 'voluntariness' of the confession." Id.
Rather, "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is
not 'voluntary.'" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. AccordRettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f 11; see
also State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah 1998) ("To violate the Fifth
Amendment, an accused's admission must, by definition, be coerced"). A confession, then,
cannot be involuntary under the federal constitution unless there is evidence that coercive
police conduct caused the confession. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164.
This is not to say, however, that a suspect's mental condition or state of mind is never
relevant to the voluntariness inquiry. To the contrary, "as interrogators have turned to more
subtle forms of psychological persuasion, courts have found the mental condition of the
defendant a more significant factor in the 'voluntariness' calculus." Connelly, 479 U.S. at
164. See also Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ^ 15. But "while mental condition is surely
relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the
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confessant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry." Connelly, 479 U.S.
at 165. Again, "for a confession to be involuntary, 'the police must somehow overreach by
exploiting a weakness or condition known to exist.'" Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 F.3d 403,410
(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d 1318, 1321 (10th Cir. 1994))
(emphasis added). Accord Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65; Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ^ 18;
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998).
Whether a confession is the product of police coercion is determined by looking at
the "totality of the circumstances." Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,1j 19; see also Nickel, 97 F.3d
at 410. Relevant factors include "duration of the interrogation, the persistence of the officers,
police trickery, absence of family and counsel, and threats and promises made to the
defendant by the officers." Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,^114. In determining whether police
exploited a known weakness or condition, courts must also consider such factors "as the
defendant's mental health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education, age, and
familiarity with the judicial system." Id. at ^[ 15. But again, absent evidence of police
coercion, a suspect's mental condition or subjective mental state standing alone cannot make
his statements to police involuntary. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65.
C.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court properly found no
evidence of coercive police conduct.
The trial court applied the foregoing authorities and factors to determine that

defendant's confession was not coerced and therefore not involuntary under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. SeeR5 87-89,591-93. After viewing the videotape of defendant's
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confession, the trial court found no evidence that the officers used any mentally coercive
techniques. R591-92. In making this finding, the trial court first considered the objective
factors listed and applied in Rettenberger. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,fflf14, 20-36.
The trial court found that the officers "did not make use of false statements or halftruths." R591; compare Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ffif 20-23 (finding some 36 police
misrepresentations sufficiently egregious to be coercive). The trial court next found that the
officers "did not use the false friend technique by implying they were acting in the best
interests of the defendant." R591; compare id. at fjf 24-28 ("extensive" use of "false friend"
technique, combined with other coercive tactics, exploited suspect's known mental
weaknesses). The trial court then found that the officers "did not use any threats or promises
to entice the defendant into a confession." R591; compare id. atfflf29-32 (finding threats
of the death penalty and promises of leniency if defendant confessed coercive). Finally, the
trial court noted that the entire interview was completed within one hour and that "defendant
was not denied any special requests." R591; compare id. at ^[ 35-36 (18-year-old
defendant was interrogated several hours over two-day period, denied request to call his
mother or use bathroom, and given 22 hours in solitary confinement). The trial court thus
concluded that "the detective[s'] interrogation was absent of suggestive and coercive
techniques" and that there was "no evidence of any ethical misconduct by the police." R59192.
The trial court then turned to the subjective factors listed in Rettenberger that might
have made the defendant more susceptible to manipulation. R592-93. The trial court noted
21

that defendant had "severe impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q," which likely
stemmed from defendant's prolonged use of Toluene, a prior stroke, or a childhood head
injury. R592. The trial court also considered defendant's "belief that he was Adolph Hitler,
but determined that the statement in context indicated that defendant knew that Hitler was
dead and that he was not actually Adolph Hitler.9 Id. The trial court also concluded that
defendant's reference to the devil telling him to shoot the victims possibly stemmed from his
religious beliefs. Id. Finally, the trial court noted that while defendant did not answer all
questions intelligently, he did provide "clear and detailed answers to many of the questions."
R592-93. The court thus concluded that "[considering the totality of the circumstances
surrounding defendant's interrogation, including his treatment by the detectives and his
mental state," defendant's confession violated neither the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
R594. In short, the trial court found no evidence that the police used any coercive tactics that
could have been construed to have exploited any known mental condition.
The videotape of defendant's interview supports the trial court's findings and
conclusions. As the trial court found, the officers made no false statements, threats, or
promises to entice the defendant to confess. R591-92. Indeed, they had no time in which to
employ any coercive tactics because defendant confessed to the shootings within four

9

In context, defendant's comment about Hitler suggests that, at most, he believed
he was a reincarnation of Hitler. See also R549-50. Given that 27% of Americans
believe in reincarnation, defendant's belief is not necessarily irrational or a sign of
incompetence. See The Religious and Other Beliefs of Americans 2003, The Harris Poll
#11, Feb. 26, 2003 at http://www.harrisinteractivexom/harris_poll/index.asp?PID:=359.
Last visited on March 23, 2006.
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minutes of being given his Miranda warnings. VT.2:13-17. But even after defendant
confessed, the officers used no coercive tactics. They never shouted or raised their voices
at defendant; nor did they make any threatening gestures. See generally VT. Rather, their
tone was conversational and non-threatening. Id. They asked non-suggestive questions and
treated defendant with respect. And the interview was over in less than an hour.
D.

The police did not exploit defendant's alleged mental condition or intoxication.
Defendant does not quarrel with the foregoing findings of the trial court. He does not

claim that the officers made threats or promises, used the false friend technique, or denied
defendant any special requests. Br. Aplt. 20-21. Nor does he argue that it was improper for
the trial court to consider the foregoing objective and subjective factors. Id. at 20-22.
Rather, he argues only that the trial court erroneously "failed to consider several [other]
relevant circumstances." Id. at 21. Specifically, he argues that the officers engaged in
coercive tactics by "disrespecting his requests to not talk about the shootings; moving
forward with the interrogation while [defendant] cried; persisting with repeated questions at
times; accelerating the pace or trading off with questions." Id. at 20. Defendant also
contends that the "officers were advised of and observed [defendant's] intoxicated and
mental condition at the beginning of and during the interrogation," and that they used this
knowledge to exploit defendant's impaired condition with the foregoing tactics.
1.

The tactics defendant alleges were not coercive.

Contrary to defendant's claims, the trial court overlooked no coercive tactics. First,
the officers did not "disrespect" his "requests to not talk about the shootings." This argument
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apparently alludes to his saying that he did not "want to talk about i f when the officers asked
who Susie was. Br. Aplt. 22; T:l-2. This claim, however, presupposes that defendant's
statement meant that he did not want to talk about the shootings at all and that the officers
intentionally disregarded defendant's wishes. The record does not support that assumption.
As the trial court understood this statement in context, defendant was not asking to
terminate the interview. R590. Rather, he was simply stating that he did not want to talk
about Susie, the woman he claimed to love. The videotape and transcript support this
reading. The statement came after the officers asked defendant who Susie was. T:2.
Defendant began crying as he answered, "She's the woman I love." VT:2:15, When the
officer repeated, "That you love," defendant said, "I don't want to talk about it." T:2. When
the officers asked why defendant did not "want to talk about it," defendant responded, "I love
that woman so much." Id. The officers shifted their questioning from specifics about Susie
to general questions about where the murders occurred. Id. Defendant readily answered
those questions. Id. The officers then asked defendant exactly what defendant did not want
to talk about. Id. They reminded defendant that he did not have to answer any of their
questions and that he could stop at any time.10 T:3. That repeated warning dispels any claim

10

Before that reminder, the officers told defendant that he could choose which
questions he wanted to answer. T:3. Defendant faults the officers for giving him false
advice on this point. In fact, their statement was not false. See United States v. May, 52
F.3d 885, 890 (10th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that "partial silence" resulting from
invocation of Miranda regarding some questions still shielded defendant from prosecutor
comment on his silence). In any event, the officers immediately followed up 1hat
statement with a reaffirmation that defendant could refuse to answer all their questions
and couid stop the interview at any time. T:3..
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that the officers disregarded any desire by defendant not to talk.
Defendant other claims of coercion—questioning a crying defendant, repeating
questions, accelerating the pace, and trading off—are frivolous.

Defendant cites no

authority, and the State is aware of none, that any of these alleged tactics are coercive either
individually or collectively.11
Defendant finally suggests that the interview was coerced because it was held at the
police station and defendant did not have the support of family, friends, or a lawyer. Br.
Aplt. 21. While holding an interview at the police station may be a factor contributing to a
finding of coercion, it is hardly dispositive. Most interrogations are conducted in the
controlled environment of a police station. See State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah
1995) (holding interview at police station instead of crime scene supported finding of no
coercion). Moreover, the mere absence of friends, or a lawyer is not coercive, particularly
where, as here, the defendant expressly waived his right to have counsel with him and did
not ask for the support of family and friends. Indeed, most voluntary confessions are made
without family, friends, or lawyers present. E.g., Galli, 967 P.2d at 933-97; State v. Bybee,
2000 UT 43,fflj17-30, 1 P.3d 1087; State v. Dutchie, 96 P.2d 422,424-29 (Utah 1998).
In sum, defendant has not shown that the trial court clearly erred when it found that
the police engaged in coercive tactics.

n

The State does not concede that the officers in fact used any of these alleged
tactics. Indeed, a review of the videotape shows no appreciable "acceleration of the
pace," no strategic "trading off," no undue repetition, and no real pressing of an
emotionally distraught defendant.
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2.

The police did not exploit any known mental condition.

Defendant faults the trial court for not sufficiently taking into account his mental
condition. Defendant contends that "the circumstances support 'the strongest probability that
[he was] incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed.'" Br. Aplt. 24 (quoting Blackburn
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (I960)). Defendant argues that this made him incapable of
voluntarily confessing. Id. at 24-26. As a preliminary matter, the trial court considered this
argument and rejected it based on the videotape. R593-94 The law and the facts support that
ruling.
As it did below, defendant's claim relies heavily on Blackburn, which suppressed a
confession made by an insane defendant. Br. Aplt. 24-26. But as the trial court recognized,
Blackburn is readily distinguishable. R593-94. Blackburn challenged the admission of his
confession to an armed robbery on the ground that he was insane when he confessed, thereby
rendering it involuntary. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 201-04. Blackburn had a long history of
mental illness and treatment. Before the robbery, "he was classified by the Veterans
Administration as 100 percent 'incompetent.'" Id. at 200-01. Experts testified at the
suppression hearing that Blackburn was likely insane and incompetent when he confessed.
Id. at 202-03. The sheriff reported that Blackbum exhibited "symptoms of insanity" after his
arrest. Id. at 201. Blackburn informed police that he had been a patient in a mental
institution, but stated that he had been released. Id. at 204. The police interrogated
Blackburn for eight or nine hours "in closely confined quarters—a room about four by six
or six by eight feet—in which as many as many as three officers had at times been present
26

with Blackburn." Id at 204.
The trial court here noted that none of the foregoing factors was present in this case.
R593. The interview lasted less than an hour and defendant had not been found to be
"incompetent" or "insane" before the crime or confession. R593-94. Nor is there any
evidence that defendant had ever received any mental health treatment before the murders.
No expert testified here that defendant was incompetent when he confessed. Defendant does
not dispute any of this, but points to the finding that he was incompetent to stand trial a few
months later. Br. Aplt. 24-25. Defendant surmises that this subsequent finding means that
he must have been incompetent to confess. Id.
That defendant was later declared incompetent to stand trial does not mean he was
incompetent to confess when he did so. But whether or not defendant was technically
competent to confess is irrelevant absent any evidence of police coercion. See Connelly, 479
U.S. at 164-65. Even Blackburn implicitly recognized this. There the confession was
suppressed not just because Blackburn appeared to be incompetent, but also because the
police knew of his mental condition and had used coercive tactics. See Blackburn, 361 U.S.
at 207-08. As the Supreme Court in Connelly explained, Blackburn involved "the integral
element of police overreaching," which "exploited" the defendant's known mental
"weakness with coercive tactics: 'the eight- to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny
room which was upon occasion literally filled with police officers; the absence of
Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel; [and] the composition of the confession by
the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn.'" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65 (quoting
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Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207-08). Thus, unlike the trial court here, the Blackburn court found
the necessary predicate to involuntariness: "coercive police activity." Id. at 167.
Moreover, while the officers in Blackburn were aware of the defendant's history of
mental illness and treatment, the officers here had no indication of a possible mental illness
until after defendant had confessed. Contrary to defendant's claim, the officers were neither
advised of nor observed any impairment in defendant's mental condition at the beginning of
the interview. During the first few minutes, defendant was alert, made eye contact, signed
a waiver, and corrected the officers when they stated he was not intoxicated with alcohol.
VT: 1:58-2:00. Although he volunteered that he was intoxicated with Toluene, he said
nothing about any mental illness at that point. Id. Indeed, it is not until page nine of the
transcript, or 10 minutes into the interview, that defendant, in response to a question, claimed
to have "[a]ll kinds" of mental problems. T:9; VT:2:23-24. But by then, defendant had
already confessed to the shootings in detail. See T:3-8. Nothing before that point would
have alerted the officers that defendant might have had a mental illness or that he could not
understand his rights or the questions put to him. Nor would the officers have thought
defendant was incapable of answering questions after he said he had "all kinds" of mental
problems. Unlike Blackburn, defendant had no history of treatment for mental illness and,
as stated, his answers throughout the interview were responsive and, for the most part,
rational. The officers, therefore, did not exploit defendant's claimed incompetence to obtain
the confession.

28

3.

The police did not exploit defendant's alleged intoxication.

Defendant also claims that the trial court did not sufficiently consider his intoxication
on Toluene. Br. Aplt. 21-23. He points out that he told officers at the beginning that he was
intoxicated on Toluene and that when they asked him if he was incapable of answering
questions, he said, "Sometimes. I don't know." Br. Aplt 21-22. Defendant also argues that
the officers "would have observed that [defendant's] demeanor was subnormal. He was
slumped down with his head lowered; at times during the interrogation he cried, and/or he
appeared confused and exhausted and was unable to answer questions." Br. Aplt. 2.
Defendant alleges that the officers "brushed aside [defendant]'s obvious impairments and
inebriated condition to proceed with questioning for a confession." Br. Aplt. 23.
Clearly, intoxication can be a relevant factor for assessing the voluntariness of a
confession. See, e.g., Scalissiv. State, 759 N.E.2d 618,621 (Ind. 2001) (intoxication factor
in considering voluntariness); State v. Bell, 121 P.3d 972, 976-77 (Kan. 2005) (same);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d983, 988 (Mass. 1997) (same). But like all factors in
a totality of the circumstances analysis, intoxication—like mental condition—by itself does
not render a confession constitutionally involuntary. See United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d
1057,1066 (10th Cir. 2003) (notperse involuntary);Luckhartv. State, 736 N.E.2d 227,231
(Ind. 2000) (same); Nichols v. Commonwealth., 142 S.W.3d 683, 692 (Ky. 2004) (same);
Siler v. State, 115 P.3d 14, 28 (Wyo. 2005) (same). Rather, as Connelly holds, "coercive
police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary.'"
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. Thus, even if a suspect is intoxicated, his confession is not
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rendered constitutionally involuntary unless police exploited that weakness with coercive
tactics. See United States v. Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1994) (even if
defendant incapacitated drug addict, his statement not involuntary absent official coercion);
UnitedStatesv. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018,1022(10thCir. 1993) ("The test is whether the person's
will was overcome, or whether the statement was freely made."); Graves v. United States,
878 F. Supp. 409,414 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("limited capacity due to voluntary consumption of
alcohol" does not render statement involuntary absent official coercion); Scalissi, 759 N.E.2d
at 621-622 (while intoxication may be factor in determining voluntariness, there must be
evidence of coercive police activity); State v. Chapman, 605 A.2d 1055,1062 (N.H. 1992)
(no involuntariness where police "did not take advantage of an intoxicated defendant");
Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d 438,446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (suspect's intoxication did not
raise constitutional voluntariness issues because no police coercion or over-reaching).
As stated, the trial court here found no evidence of police coercion. Thus, even
assuming defendant was intoxicated at the time of his confession, that confession was
constitutionally voluntary. Moreover, courts uniformly agree that intoxication can render
a confession involuntary only where the suspect is so intoxicated that he does not
comprehend what he is saying or is unable to carry on a conversation. See, e.g., Cox, 711
So.2d at 1325 (question is whether defendant is aware, able to comprehend what he is doing,
and communicate in rational way); Luckhart, 736 N.E.2d at 229-31 (involuntary if
intoxication renders defendant unconscious of his acts or produces state of mania); Nichols,
142 S. W.3 d at 691-92 (involuntary if defendant hallucinating or confabulating to compensate
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for lost memory); Kirksey v. State, 923 P.2d 1102,1109-10 (Nev. 1996) (question is whether
defendant understands meaning of his comments); Jones v. State, 944 S. W.2d 642, 651 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) (question is whether intoxication rendered defendant incapable of making
independent, informed decision to confess); Siler, 115 P.3d at 26 (Wyo. 2005) (intoxication
must render defendant incapable of understanding his statements).
It is clear on this record that defendant was not so intoxicated. Although defendant
told the officers at the beginning of the interview that he was "intoxicated" on Toluene,
VT: 1:58, his demeanor did not support that statement. During the first three minutes of the
videotape, defendant was alert and responsive to the officer's questions and statements. Id.
He read and signed the waiver and he corrected Detective Edwards when the latter stated that
defendant was not intoxicated by alcohol. Id. Defendant seizes on his early statement that
he was "sometimes" incapable of answering questions. Defendant's subsequent responses,
however, belie that claim. Moreover, even though defendant kept his head lowered
throughout the interview, he did not, as he now claims, appear "confused and exhausted and
. . . unable to answer questions." Br. Aplt 22. Rather, as the trial court recognized,
defendant was able to give detailed, complex answers that were responsive to the questions
put to him. R592-93. See, e.g., T:5,11 (describing caliber ofpistols used); T: 5-6 (describing
where he shot Chuck); T:7 (describing his car and license plate number); T:8-9 (giving
detailed medical history, including when he began receiving SSI); T:15-16 (describing
Scotty's reaction to his mother's shooting); T: 16-17 (listing several grievances he had against
Susie); T:29-30 (physically demonstrating how he shot the victims). Finally, his speech was
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neither slurred nor abnormally slow.
In sum, the officers did not "brush aside" any "obvious impairments" in questioning
defendant. Nor can it be said that defendant was so intoxicated that he did not understand
his statements to police. Defendant's confession, therefore, was constitutionally voluntary.
E.

Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary.
Defendant argues that his waiver of Miranda was neither knowing or voluntary.

Whether a suspect has validly waived his Miranda rights depends on the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738,744 (Utah 1997); State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221,
224 (Utah 1989).
"Miranda warnings are intended to guard against the 'inherently coercive nature of
a custodial police interrogation by fully informing the suspect of the state's intention to use
any self-incriminating statements to secure his [or her] conviction.'" State v. Archuleta, 850
P.2d 1232, 1238-39 (Utah 1993) (quoting Strain, 779 P.2d at 224). Thus, the waiver "must
have been the product of a 'free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or
deception' and executed with' full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned
and [of] the consequences of the decision to abandon it.'" Strain, 779 P.2d at 224 (quoting
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). Accord Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1238-39.
Like the voluntariness inquiry for confessions, the "voluntariness of a waiver of [the
Fifth Amendment right to silence] has always depended on the absence of police
overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word." Connelly, 479 U.S. at
170. This is because the "sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was
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based, is governmental coercion." Id. Moreover, "the State need prove waiver only by a
preponderance of the evidence." Id.
In arguing that his Miranda waiver was unknowing and involuntary, defendant relies
on many of the same facts cited in his claim of coercion. But just as there is no evidence that
police coerced defendant's confession, there is no evidence that they coerced his Miranda
waiver. His rights were read to him on camera and he unequivocally waived each one
individually. T: 1. The record also shows that defendant, a 45-year-old man, understood his
rights and the consequences of abandoning those rights. While defendant initially said he
might be incapable of answering questions because of his Toluene use, his interactions and
subsequent responses to police show that he fully understood their questions and that he was
capable of answering them. When asked if he knew why police wanted to talk to him, he
immediately responded, "The murders out there... at West Valley." T:l-2. When defendant
said he did not "want to talk about it," the officers again told defendant that he did not "have
to answer any ofour questions at all. You can stop at any time." T:3. Defendant agreed that
the officers had made that "clear" to him. T:3. Yet he never said that he would not talk to
officers at all or that he wished to terminate the interview. More important, defendant's
responses throughout the interview amply demonstrate that he was sufficiently sober and
lucid to understand his rights and to waive them.12 The trial court, therefore, properly found
12

Defendant makes much of his subsequent incompetence to stand trial as proof
that he did not fully understand his Miranda rights. As explained above, however, the
fact that defendant was later found to be incompetent for purposes of standing trial does
not necessarily mean that he did not or could not understand his Miranda rights at the
time he waived them. Indeed, two of his evaluators expressly gave him forensic
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that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.
F.

Defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent.
Defendant contends that even if his waiver was voluntary, he subsequently

unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent when, after the officers asked him what
happened to Susie, he said, "I don't want to talk about it." Br. Aplt.27-34. See T:2.
Defendant argues that police were required to terminate the interview at this point.
Once a custodial suspect "effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the
Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him." Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994). "But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the
interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or
the suspect himself reinitiates conversation." Id. If, however, the suspect is "not reasonably
clear in his reference to an attorney, officers are not required to stop questioning or focus on
clarifying the suspect's statement." Leyva, 951 P.2d at 742 (citing Davis). Rather, "'the
suspect must unambiguously request counsel,'" and if his 'statement fails to meet the
requisite level of clarity,' then the officers are not required to stop questioning the suspect."
Id. (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). In other words, "after a knowing and voluntary waiver
of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless
the suspect clearly requests an attorney." Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added). This

warnings, which are very similar to Miranda rights, and noted that he understood those
rights. R533, 548. One of the evaluators also noted that defendant "was able to described
what happened in fairly good detail, generally consistent with the police records
pertaining to the case." R549.
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Court has extended the Davis rule to reinvocations of the right to remain silent. State v.
Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 935 n.4 (Utah 1998).
The question, then, is whether defendant unequivocally invoked his right to remain
silent when defendant said, "I don't want to talk about it." T:2. When that statement is read
in context, it is clear that he did not.
Defendant's statement came after he told officers that Susie, a shooting victim, was
the woman he loved. Tl-2. Defendant paused as he started to cry. VT:2:15. Detective
Edwards then asked what happened to Susie, to which defendant replied, "I don't want to
talk about it." T:2; VT:2:14-15. Detective Edwards repeated, "You don't want to talk about
it?" And defendant responded "No." T:2. After another short pause while defendant cried,
Sergeant Spann asked defendant, "Why don't you want to talk about it?" Defendant tearfully
replied, "I love that woman so much." Id. As stated, this statement came within two minutes
of defendant's waiving his Miranda rights and telling police that he wanted to talk to them.
In context, defendant's statement was not an unequivocal invocation of the right to
remain silent and to not answer any more questions. Rather, the context makes clear that
defendant only had an emotional aversion to talking about what happened to the "woman
[he] love[d]." When asked why he did not want to talk about it, defendant did not say he
wanted to stop answering all questions. Instead, he made it clear that he did not want to talk
about what happened to Susie because it was emotionally painful for him. Nothing in the
foregoing suggests that defendant was refusing to answer any questions or that he did not
want to talk further. The ensuing interchange confirms that reading.
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The officers asked defendant, "What is it that you don't want to talk about? You said
murders in West Valley, where in West Valley?" Id. Defendant responded with his address.
Id. After asking who lived with defendant, the officers repeated, "Okay, what don't you want
to talk about? Edgar? What don't you want to talk about, Ed?" As defendant continued to
cry, Sergeant Spann reminded defendant of his right to remain silent:
Edgar, we're not going to force you [to] talk about anything. We're asking
you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer[] this question[],
not answer that question, answer this question, not answer that question. You
don't have to answer any of our questions at all You can stop any anytime.
T:3 (emphasis added); VT:2:15-16. Defendant replied, "Okay," and Sergeant Spann added,
"He made that clear to you, right?" Defendant said, "Ya." The officers then reminded
defendant that he had just told them that he wanted to talk them. They then asked again,
"what part do you and what part don't you want to talk to.us about?" Defendant then readily
answered all other questions put to him.13 T:3; VT:2:16-17.
If, as defendant now claims, he intended to invoke his right to silence, the officers
gave him ample opportunity to unequivocally assert that. As soon as he stated that he did not
"want to talk about it," the officers tried to ascertain what defendant did not want to talk
about; part of the crime or all of the crime. They also expressly readvised him that he did not

13

Defendant suggests that it is impermissible under Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91,
97-98 (1984) to consider any subsequent statements in determining whether an invocation
is ambiguous. Br. Aplt. 34. It is true that subsequent responses to continued police
questioning cannot be used to render ambiguous an otherwise unambiguous invocation of
the right to silence. Smith, 469 U.S. at 97-98. Here, however, defendant's alleged
invocation was at best ambiguous. His immediate subsequent responses only confirm that
ambiguity.
36

have to answer any questions and that he could stop the interview at any time. Defendant,
however, expressed no wish to stop or to not answer any more questions. The contrary, he
showed a willingness to talk about the crime, just not about the specifics of Susie's injuries.
Even giving defendant's statement the most liberal reading, it was no more than an
equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. See, e.g., Owen v. State, 862 So.2d 687,
696-97 (Fla. 2003) (noting that response "I don't want to talk about it," has been deemed "on
numerous occasions" to be equivocal). Cf. Galli, 967 P.2d at 935 (interpreting statement "I
can't even talk right now" as not even equivocal invocation of right to silence). The officers,
therefore, had no obligation to stop questioning or even to clarify defendant's intent. The
officers nevertheless clarified defendant's intent by reminding him that he could stop the
interview at anytime. By not unequivocally invoking his right to remain silent at that point,
defendant demonstrated that he wished to continue speaking to the officers.
The trial court therefore did not clearly err in finding that defendant did not
unequivocally invoke his right to silence.
POINT II
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE DID NOT VIOLATE
DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WHERE
POLICE DID NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH; THIS COURT SHOULD NOT
REACH DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAIM, BUT IF IT DOES, THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE
FEDERAL STANDARD
Defendant argues that the trial court should have dismissed this case because the
destruction of physical evidence has impaired his right to a fair trial, thereby violating his due
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process rights under both the federal and state constitutions. Br. Aplt. 35-50. Defendant's
federal due process claim fails because he has not shown that the police acted in bad faith in
destroying the evidence. This Court should not reach his state due process claim because he
did not preserve it below. Should this Court nevertheless reach that issue, it should decline
to adopt a different standard under the state constitution.
A.

To prevail on a federal due process claim, defendant must show that the evidence
was constitutionally material or that it was lost due to bad faith by State actors.
The State's duty to preserve evidence falls into "what might loosely be called the area

of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence." California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,
485 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The duty to preserve evidence
is closely related to the duty to disclose evidence that is exculpatory. The latter is violated
whenever "the State suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence"
irrespective of "the good or bad faith of the prosecution" Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544,
547 (2004) (per curiam) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) & United States v.
Agurs, All U.S. 97 (1976)). The "mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information
might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not
establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." Agurs, All U.S. at 109-10. Rather,
omitted evidence is constitutionally material only if it "creates a reasonable doubt that did
not otherwise exist." Id. at 112.
The State's duty to preserve evidence is likewise limited to that which is
constitutionally material: "Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve
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evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant
role in the suspect's defense." Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89. "To meet this standard of
constitutional materiality, . . . evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was
apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would
be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." Id. at 489.
The Due Process Clause, however, imposes a different test when dealing '"with the
failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that
it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the
defendant.'" Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57
(1988)). "[T]he failure to preserve this 'potentially useful evidence' does not violate due
process 'unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.'" Id. at
547-48 (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). Bad faith requires that a defendant show more
than mere negligence. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. The defendant must show that "the
police . . . by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the
defendant." Id. In other words, the bad faith conduct must be such that it supports an
inference that police destroyed the evidence because they knew of its exculpatory value. See
State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324 (Utah App. 1998).
A defendant, then, can establish a due process violation for destruction of evidence
in two ways: (1) he can show that the destroyed evidence "possess[ed] an exculpatory value
that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed" and no other comparable evidence is
available, Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489; or (2) if the evidence is only potentially useful, he can
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show that the police acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence, such that "their conduct
indicate[d] that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant," Youngblood,
488 U.S. at 58. The burden is on the defendant to establish the due process violation. See
id at 57-58. See also Holden, 964 P.2d at 324.
B.

Defendant has not shown that the destroyed evidence was either constitutionally
material or destroyed in bad faith.
The evidence destroyed here included the two revolvers used in the murders, a Code

R kit, a victim's wallet, heroin, an audio tape, a blood specimen, a make-up kit, drug
paraphernalia, various articles of the victims' clothing, bedding, a bone fragment found on
one victim's bed, a bottle with green liquid, a gallon can of Toluene, .38 and .22 caliber
bullets, bullet fragments, shell casings, hair and saliva samples, and gunshot residue from
defendant and Debrah. See Add, B.
Defendant does not claim, nor did he below, that this evidence possessed an
exculpatory value apparent before it was destroyed. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. See R39192. He instead argues that the evidence was "potentially useful" to him and that the police
acted with bad faith in destroying it. Br. Aplt. 35-42. However, he has shown neither.
1.

The destroyed evidence was not "potentially useful."

Defendant speculates that the destroyed evidence was "potentially useful" to him in
three ways: (1) "if the ballistics evidence, blood and tissue samples, gunshot residue and
fingerprint evidence were such that it would support that [Debrah] was involved in the
shootings, that evidence would serve to impeach [Debrah's] credibility and her claims
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regarding [defendant's] actions; (2) the Code R kit might have shown that Debrah did not
suffer "trauma, tenderness, redness, or bruising to the genitalia for forced penetration,"
thereby impeaching her credibility; (3) evidence "tying drugs and paraphernalia" to Debrah
and others in the trailer could have created doubt about Debrah's ability to accurately observe
events or might have shown that victims "made threats to [defendant] in their drug-induced
state," thereby provoking the attack Br. Aplt. 40-41.
Defendant's speculation notwithstanding, he has not demonstrated that the destroyed
evidence was "potentially useful." First, defendant's argument ignores all the evidence that
has been turned over to him: autopsy photos and reports; toxicology reports; a rape report
by St. Mark's Hospital; photos of weapons and ammunition; firearm analysis reports;
transcripts of interviews with Debrah and Scotty; other witness statements; a videotaped
interview of Debrah; and a videotape and photos of the crime scene. See R60-61. Second,
it ignores Debrah's eyewitness testimony and defendant's own confession. Taken together,
this dispels any claim that the destroyed evidence was potentially useful or that there is no
comparable available evidence.
For example, defendant may use Debrah's interviews, the videotape and photos of the
crime scene, and the firearm analysis reports, to impeach any inconsistencies or inaccuracies
that might arise in her testimony. Next, while the Code R kit may be gone, a written rape
report by the hospital remains. Defendant has not alleged, much less shown, that this report
is inadequate to show a lack genital injuries. More important, evidence of the sexual assault
is irrelevant given that defendant is no longer charged with sexual assault. With respect to
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tying the drugs and paraphernalia to the victims, defendant disregards the toxicology reports
of Susie and Chuck, which showed no illegal drugs in their blood at the time of death.14 This
supports Debrah's claim that they did not use drugs that night. R630:40-41.
But even setting aside the remaining evidence, defendant cannot show that any of the
destroyed evidence was even potentially useful if this Court concludes that his confession
was voluntary. Rather, defendant's valid confession, particularly in view of Debrah's
consistent preliminary hearing testimony, stands as a concession that the destroyed evidence
was all inculpatory and, therefore, potentially useful only to the State.
2.

The police did not destroy the evidence in bad faith.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the evidence was potentially useful, defendant has not
carried his burden of proving that police destroyed it in bad faith. As the trial court observed,
defendant did not even attempt to carry this burden below. R602. Instead, he tried to cast
his burden on the State by asserting that the State's conduct was "[a]t the very least,... gross
negligence" (R3 92-93), and that "bad faith should be presumed in this case unless and until
the government is able to offer an explanation for the destruction of this evidence." R39394, 602. The trial court properly rejected this misstatement of the law and found that
defendant had "failed to meet [his] burden." R602-03.
For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that the destruction of evidence was in
bad faith because it was done "wilfully." Br. Aplt. 39. Because defendant did not present

14

See Toxicology Reports attached to Autopsy Reports in Envelope marked

Exhibits.
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this argument below, this Court should disregard it. See State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, fflf
47-48, 106 P.3d 734 (declining to consider defendant's claim of bad faith raised for the first
time on appeal).
The argument is meritless in any event. That evidence is intentionally destroyed
pursuant to routine procedures, does not establish bad faith within the meaning of
Youngblood. See Fisher, 540 U.S. at 546-47 (no bad faith where police, "acting in accord
with established procedures," destroyed evidence during defendant's ten-year flight from
justice). As explained above, in demonstrating bad faith, defendant has the burden of
proving that "the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form
a basis for exonerating the defendant." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.
Defendant cannot meet his burden. The evidence was destroyed approximately two
years after the charges had been dismissed due to defendant's incompetence to stand trial,
and approximately a year after the court was informed that defendant likely would never be
competent to stand trial.

Add. B;R636:15-17.

Indeed, the record suggests that

everyone—the prosecution, the defense, and the trial court—reasonably believed that
defendant would never stand trial, but that the community would be adequately protected
based on his civil commitment. Thus, it was both natural and reasonable for the police to
assume that the evidence would never be needed. This reasonable assumption was only
confirmed when five years later, in 1998, the district attorney's office wrote a letter to the
State Hospital declaring that it still did not intend to pursue the original charges. R558.
In short, the record makes clear that the police destroyed the evidence according to
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established procedures and only after the case had been dismissed and it appeared that
charges would never be refiled. Moreover, police had no reason to think that any of the
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory in light of defendant's confession and Debrah's
statement. Accordingly, defendant has not shown police conduct indicating that "the
evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 88.
C.

Defendant's state constitutional claim is unpreserved.
Defendant argues that even if he has not shown bad faith, this Court should reverse

the trial court's ruling based on a state constitutional analysis under article I, § 7, of the Utah
Constitution. Br. Aplt. 42-50. Defendant urges this Court to reject Youngblood's due
process analysis and to adopt "a balancing approach" used by a minority of states in
interpreting their state constitutions. Br. Aplt. 46-50.
This Court should decline defendant's invitation because he did not make this
argument below. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990) (declining to
conduct separate state constitutional analysis where trial court not afforded meaningful
opportunity to address issue). While defendant asked the trial court to engage in a state
constitutional analysis, the trial court declined because defendant had "offered no analysis
concerning the unique context in which Utah's Constitution developed, nor shown why this
State's Constitution should be interpreted differently than the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution." R604. The trial court also noted that
although defendant had cited "to numerous cases in other state jurisdictions that have
'rejected Younblood" he had "not articulated the rulings of other states correctly," nor had
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he "suggested a viable alternative standard." R605. Indeed, at oral argument on the motion
to dismiss, defendant cast the burden on the trial court to determine what standard should
apply under the state constitution:
And I didn't really address this, you know because it's—it's not really a
secondary issue, but, I mean, the obvious question is, Well, what standard do
we follow? And [the] answer is, "Well, these different states have articulated
a bunch of different standards. If the Court sees fit, you know, that is
something we can address secondarily as to which standard. But it would be
something along the lines of what is listed in the motion.
R63 8:27-28. Defendant's written motion, however, proposed no specific test. See R394-02.
Because defendant did not preserve the state constitutional analysis that he now urges
on appeal, this Court should not address it. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^f 14,
122 P.3d 506 ("we are resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not
been properly preserved, framed and briefed"), cert, granted 126 S.Ct. 979 (Jan. 6,2006).15
D.

Even if defendant had preserved his state constitutional claim, defendant has not
shown that this Court should adopt a separate state analysis.
Even if defendant had adequately preserved his state constitutional claim, he has not

shown that this Court should adopt a separate state constitutional analysis in this case or that
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This Court should also decline to address defendant's state constitutional claim
because he has not adequately developed it using "historical and textual evidence, sister
state law, and policy arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to
assist [the Court] in arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision in question."
Society of Separations ts, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993). While
defendant does cite to sister state law, he fails to analyze his claim within "the unique
context in which Utah's constitution developed." Bobo, 803 P.3d at 1272 n.5 Indeed, he
does not even mention that the language of the federal and state due process clauses are
identical or explain why, given that circumstance, the clauses should be interpreted
differently.
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it should reject Youngblood'§ well-reasoned analysis. In urging this Court to adopt a
different state constitutional analysis, defendant cites to several cases in which other
jurisdictions have rejected Youngbloodunder their state constitutions. Defendant views those
decisions as fairer and less draconian than Youngblood's bad faith test. Br. Aplt. 45-50.
Defendant's argument, however, ignores the sound policy considerations underlying
Youngblood and the many jurisdictions that have embraced the bad faith requirement under
their state constitutions.
Ten states follow Youngblood, It is fitting that the Arizona Supreme Court was one
of the first to expressly adopt Youngblood's bad faith requirement under its own constitution.
It did so on remand from the United States Supreme Court. See State v. Youngblood, 844
P.2d 1152, 1156-58 (Ariz. 1993). In so doing, the court explained why the rule announced
in Youngblood was fundamentally fair.
The court first explained why Brady violations and unpreserved evidence are treated
differently. Under Brady, '"the suppression by the prosecution of [material] evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates [federal] due process . . . irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."5 Youngblood, 844 P.2d at 1156 (alterations in
original). This "makes sense" because constitutionally material "[e]xculpatory evidence
matters whether the police exercise good faith or bad faith in failing to produce it." Id. In
such cases, the "defendant is prejudiced by definition because the unproduced evidence is
plainly exculpatory." Id. The remedy for a Brady violation, however, is not a dismissal, but
a new trial at which the evidence is available. Id.
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"In stark contrast to Brady" unpreserved evidence "is neither plainly exculpatory nor
inculpatory." Id, "Under these circumstances, one can only say that the evidence might have
been exculpatory, or the evidence might have been inculpatory." Id, Thus, unlike Brady
material "there is no showing of prejudice in fact."16 Id,
In Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court held "that for this class of evidence,
the good or bad faith of the state is relevant because of an inference that can be drawn from
the bad faith of the police." Id. "A conscious, intentional or malicious failure to preserve
evidence which could be tested suggests 'that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating
the defendant.'" Id, (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). But in the Brady context, good
or bad faith does not matter "because by definition Brady materials are plainly exculpatory
and no inference is required." Id.
As the Arizona Supreme Court noted, the Youngblood rule promotes fundamental
fairness. "When the state exhibits bad faith in the handling of critical evidence, it is
fundamentally unfair to allow the trial to proceed." Id. at 1157. In that case, the "remedy is
to tell the state it will not be allowed to prosecute the case." Id. In addition, "[b]ad faith
strengthens the inference that the evidence might be exculpatory to an unacceptable level."
Id. But "where there is no bad faith, it is fundamentally unfair to bar the state from [the]
courts." Id. Absent a showing of bad faith, the "inference that the evidence may be

16

This circumstance is, of course, distinguishable from that mentioned in
Trombetta, where a defendant may be able to show that destroyed evidence was
constitutionally material. The defendant need not show bad faith in that context.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489.
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exculpatory is not strong enough to dismiss the case." Id. Indeed, given that "a Brady
violation results only in a new trial, it would be bizarre to suggest that, because of a nonmalignant fortuity, fundamental fairness would require the dismissal of the charges." Id. In
other words, the mere "possibility of prejudice is not"— nor should it be—"sufficient to
justify the ultimate sanction-an order of dismissal."17 Id.
Seven states do not follow Youngblood. Defendant urges this Court to follow those
states that have rejected Youngblood's "litmus test of one factor" in favor of a balancing test
that considers several factors, including the good or bad faith of the police. Br. Aplt. 46-47.
As a preliminary matter, Youngblood does not have a litmus test of one factor. As explained,
the threshold question under federal due process is whether the lost or destroyed evidence
is constitutionally material or only "potentially useful." See Fisher, 540 U.S. 545, 548. If
17

The nine other jurisdictions adopting the bad faith requirement under their state
constitutions are: People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 886 (Cal. 1991) (rejecting express
request to not follow Trombetta, and implicit request to not follow Youngblood on state
law grounds, and holding that "[t]he reasons that caused [the court] to adopt Trombetta in
[a previous holding] apply also to Youngblood")] People v. Pecoraro, 677 N.E.2d 875,
887 (111. 1997) (adhering to "well-reasoned principles set forth in Trombetta and
Youngblood for purposes of. . . state due process clause"); State v. Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d
787, 792 (Iowa 1992) (recognizing state's previous adoption of Youngbloodunder Iowa
constitutional law); State v. Finley, 42 P.3d 723, 728 (Kan. 2002) (considering and
rejecting argument to grant accused any more due process rights under state constitution);
Collins v. Commw., 951 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky. 1997) (expressly adopting Youngblood
in its state constitutional analysis); State v. Anderson, 724 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Me. 1999)
(state due process clause provides no more rights than those found in federal due process
clause); Patterson v. State, 741 A.2d 1119, 1128-29 (Md. 1999) (reiterating that Maryland
follows United States Supreme Court in interpreting state due process clause); State v.
Drdak, 411 S.E.2d 604, 608 (N.C. 1992) (citing Youngblood and adopting its test under
state constitution); State v. Greenwold, 525 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Wis. App. 1994) (holding
that Wisconsin and federal due process protections are identical), rev. den W, 531 N.W.2d
329 (Wis. 1995).
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the defendant can show that the evidence is constitutionally material—exculpatory and
unique—he is entitled to either suppression or dismissal depending on the importance of the
evidence. This, as in Brady material, is the result irrespective of the intent of the police. See
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89. Youngblood's bad faith requirement arises only when the
evidence mightbe exculpatory, i.e., potentially useful. As explained, that requirement makes
perfect sense in this context because, absent an inference arising from police bad faith, any
prejudice to defendant is, at best, speculative.
Defendant urges this Court to adopt Delaware's balancing test from Hammond v.
State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989). See Br. Aplt. 47. Hammondpresents a complicated formula.
It first requires the court to determine whether the evidence would have been subject to
disclosure under state discovery rules or Brady. Hammond, 569 A.2d at 88. If so, the court
must then evaluate the State's duty to preserve discoverable evidence. Id. If the court finds
such a duty, it must then balance three factors: (1) "the degree of negligence or bad faith
involved," id. at 88-89; (2) "the importance of the missing evidence and the reliability of the
secondary or substitute evidence that remains available," id. at 89; and (3) "an examination
of the sufficiency of the evidence, which the State presented at trial," id. at 90.
While a balancing test like Hammond's may have superficial appeal, it offers no
improvement over Trombetta and Youngblood.

Indeed, its practical application is

problematic, particularly in the pre-trial stages. First, two of the three Hammond factors are
those considered in both Trombetta and Youngblood—materiality, the availability of
alternative evidence, and the bad faith of the police. Hammond adds to the mix a comparison
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of the unpreserved evidence to the evidence ultimately presented at trial. But as a practical
matter, this third factor is merely another assessment of the materiality of the missing
evidence or prejudice suffered by defendant. Second, Hammond offers no guidance on how
much weight should be given to each factor or how they should be balanced. Finally, it is
impossible under Hammond to assess the sufficiency of the evidence until after trial, and all
the evidence has been presented.
Given the foregoing, defendant has not shown that the Trombetta/Youngblood
standards do not adequately protect his state due process rights or that the Hammond
balancing test is superior.
E.

Defendant has shown no state constitutional violation in any case.
But even assuming that there might be a case in which a separate state constitutional

analysis would be appropriate, this is not such a case. As explained above, the destroyed
evidenced in this case is not even potentially exculpatory or useful to the defendant. To the
extent that it might have some value to defendant, there appears to be comparable available
evidence. Finally, a dismissal of the case at this stage is premature, even under defendant's
authorities, where all the available evidence has not yet been developed nor presented to the
trier of fact. Until that time, it is impossible to fully assess the materiality of the destroyed
evidence or its prejudicial affect on defendant's ability to present a defense.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the trial court's rulings.
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Addendum A

ADDENDUM A
Constitutional Provisions

U.S. CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2 [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office ]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.}
5. [Power to-enforce amendment.!

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Addendum B

ADDENDUM B
Police Property Tracking Tags
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F'

....-w ;;?i, i-jie LI.U _
^ :.-.-ective Ron Edwards,
- ;-st Valley Police Dep:. . ~v, . Td Spann with the West
I ley Police Department. : have tc read you your rights per
./-rand?-. T ~; y: i understand that?

ET: Ya.
RE:

You hav3 o:.o r^..:. ^ ^ ^., o x . c . ^.y^u.::^ ^ . u say can-and
will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the
right to have a lawyer present before any questioning. Do you

ET:
RE:

inaudible
^w y c „ u n d e r s t a n d
anytime?

that

you c a n .MUM i 11 * ~. «\\iesi i * in I mi 11

ET: Y a .
i- JM

ii you cannot afford an attorney / we will provide one for you.
Do you unde^^t-.^rr! i-v*~+-?

L T i

Y

RE:

0:i you still wish to speak to us at this ti me?

a

.

.

.

- •;

I l

HE:
FT:

Are you

intoxicated?

Ti t o l u e n e .

II

Uli.it' J t o l u e n e ?

ETi

Toluene .

Hi ;

1" * ,

11 " c,

i t ! s a paint thinner.

i ] i I in ml t h i n n e r ?

ET:

Ti,

RF:

wkay, do you know why we ! re ----

E T

!! ,

•

RE I

'

•

•

What are we going to talk to you about?

?

. "•;•' ."'
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ET:

The murders out there.

RE:

What murders?

ET:

The murders out there at West Valley.

RE:

Who are they?

ET:

Suzie, Chuck and Scotty.

RE:

Whose Suzie?

ET:

She's the woman I love.

RE:

That you love?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

What happened to her?

ET:

I don't want to talk about it.

RE:

You don't want to talk about it?

ET:

No.

ES:

Edgar?

ET:

What.

ES:

Why don't you want to talk about it?

ET:

I love that woman so much.

ES:

What is it that you don't want to talk about?
murders in West Valley, where in West Valley?

ET:

.... inaudible....Hummingbird Street.

ES:

I'm sorry, where?

ET:

13 08 Hummingbird Street.

ES:

1308 Hummingbird, who lives there?

ET:

Me.

You said

TAPED INTERVIEW
EDGAR TIEDEMANN
NOVEMBER 2, 19 91
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RE:

Who II /es wi tli you ?

ET:

Suzie and Scotty and they just moved in last ni- v *
.know.

RE:

Okay, what don't you want to talk about?
you want to talk about, Ed?

ES:

Edgar, we're not going to force you talk about anything.
We're asking you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you
can answers this questions, not answer that question, answer
this question, not answer that question. Ycu don't have to
answer any of our questions at all.. You can stop at anytime..

ET:

01; ay.

ES:

He made that clear to yoi i, right?

ET:

Ya. .

E.'"

Edgar?

JL don f t

What don't

^ - ---I s u a ^ a j-^u *ct...-.::u uo talk to us, wnat part do you
< vrv^t part don't- vou want to talk to us about?

P-

- cio you remember me reading you're rights earlier and you
no a waiver for r^ t ^ search your hnmp^

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Okay, we_were called t o ;;r: oi :i r home on a gunshot. ' We got in
there and seen some people.• Who 'shot them?

ET:

Me.

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Whv

ET:

:

RE:

Why

: :

~

-—. shooc them?

.. ~o ^.^_.o cause 1 1 o\ e her and I shot the other two
\.:

; r\, --; Chuck for?
th' a iriLi ii: • i\ =a:

RE:

Gkay

;\z.

:a i eora ge t, come into the picture?
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ET:

I was going to shoot her too but she was pregnant.

RE:

Okay, why?

ET:

I shot Suzie cause I love her, I love her so much.

RE:

Was she going to leave you?

ET:

No.

RE:

If you loved her that much, there's a reason why you shot her.
Could you please explain why you shot her?

ET

I don't know.

RE

Okay.

ET

I don't know.

RE

Was it daylight?

ET

I don't know.

RE

How long have you been sniffing that solvent?

ET

Since 1962.

RE

Tonight how long?

ET

All day.

RE

Do you know what today's date is?

ET

You told me but I don't remember.

RE

Do you know what day of the week it is?

ET

No.

RE

What was yesterday?

ET

I don't have any idea.

ES

Do you work Edgar?

ET

No, I'm on SSI.

Why did you shoot them?

She wouldn't.

What time did you shoot them?

Or today?
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r.. : Social Security Supplemental Income.
v

-"u

p-.

^v3V.

*->•-/-

~*

RE*

V m t d:

Rl.

n i i - dti ,T ?u sh-c 4 - Yartin with?

ET i

Wh' ^ ~ *" " *" y

:un

c

jia

y O U

i:r:?

^ cu -h:cr Suzie with?

~>

ET ; U ~:, th at ' s Scctry.
RE:

Is that Scotty?

ET:

Ya. '

RE:

That w a s sleeping on the floor?

RE;

-jr:ay, what did y o u shoot him with?

ET::" I cl : • :n. 't know.
RE:

Wh i t d i cl y o u s h o o t C1 m c J : % i 11 L ?

ET:

.38.

RE:

How many t:i m e s

ET:

Twice.

RE:

Where at?

ET:

T h e fhr o 'it.

RE:

And wherry else?

:i :i :i y : I i ; 1 i : • : I:: Clin i :;] ;::?
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ET:

I didnft see where the other place was.

RE:

Was he trying to get out of the bed?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Who did you shoot first?

ET:

Suzie.

RE:

Then what happened?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

So they were all asleep?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

They were both awake talking to you?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Where were the guns at when you decided to shoot them?

ET:

My hands.

RE:

Where were the guns at before you picked up the guns?
did you go get the guns from?

ET:

I picked, got them out of my room.

RE:

Is yours the bedroom way in the back?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Okay.

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Was Chuck asleep?

ET:

I think so.

RE:

Okay. When you got the. guns, where were, were they already
loaded or did you have to load them?

Did Scott wake up?

No they was both awake.

Where

You took them out of that bedroom?
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ET:

They w e r e already loaded.

RE;

Tc y o u always carry loaded guns x^

RE:

What kind cf jar do y o u own?

ETi

1^1 ,

RE:

Okay, u^ ;-r: kr.ov vh.-t •'-h-t licer.se plate number is?

ET:

'. , ah ?-!^-*

FE:

Ok.ly

ET:

Ah, since November cf 19 3 0 .

RE:

Whose "' - -1 * V -- - v--'•

KT:

TJUII'L

RE:

Okay, whose

i11 '

"> I

RE:

She d i d n ' t ?

ES:

H o w lonq h a v n y o u and Suzie been toq<--ther?

I I

"I housandj cL years.

RE:

Does Suzie work? •

ET:

She "'s n prosti ti ite.

ES:

What•s uuzie's last name?

ET:

Sessions.

1 1 E:

:

^ :-"«_

.

_*.,_« ;

'

nought: . >

1;

u

iptirei. I J L

- _?

'
L^I

'

iv.. r.

," .

I s si le . i , . . .
Tha t!s why she has to stupid work,

ET:

She shoots heroin.

ES:

Do you d ::> d r \ igs a 3 so

Edga r?
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ET:

No, I don't do, I used to do it. I done it with her for about
two or three, I mean two or three days and it didn't even
effect me or anything. I know I didn't, couldn't even get
off, just got back to toluene.

RE:

So why did you have to shoot Suzie?

ET;

I don't know, I don't know.

ES:

Does Suzie usually sleep in the bedroom with you or does she
sleep on the couch?

ET:

No, no, she just moved in.

RE:

How long have you known Suzie?

ET:

About 10 years.

RE:

And how long has she moved in with you?

ET:

She moved in about, she lived out there in Rose Park for about
two or three months after my mom died and she got an apartment
of her own and then.

RE:

How old are you Edgar?

ET:

45.

RE:

How long have you been on Social Security?

ET:

Since November of 88.

RE:

Where did you work at before you went on Social Security?

ET:

I don't remember.

RE;

Do you have any physical impairments? Any physical injuries?

ET:

I had a stroke. I couldn't get out of my room for three days.
I couldn't talk for seven. I was in the hospital for two and
a half months.

RE:

You said you had a stroke?

ET:

Ya.

She's...
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K I1! I

lvu"rt

i. C i J i—(' a .J G ?

ET;

... inaudible. . .it was 1980, I mean 1988, November of 1988.
The papers are i n the trailer,

RE:

Okay,

ET:

Ya. A ] ] k:i nds.

RE:

What k i n d of m e n t a l p r o b l e m s ?

ET:

See, I t h i n k I ' m Adolf H i t l e r , .
Adolf H i t l e r d i e d i n May of
5 and I was "born i n 1 9 , O c t o b e r 194 6,
I t h :i nk I 1 in Ade 1 f

Is there any mental problems?

lex.

ES:

Edgar, was Suzie your girlfriend?

FT:

Ya, 1 loved her more than anything else In this world.

ii»o :

Did

b U u IL"

1 I.I 4 i..

j i 'I! "

'

1 don'l^ I don't know, T T don't think so. I don ! t think she
did.
ES: . Well you've know her off and on for ten years and...
ET:

FT:

'£•

ES:

Is she living in your mom's house In Rose Park?

ET: Ya.
ES i

Dl I i c i I ] I G \ a I: \ : i ri : rii :;: • i 1 3 1: ioi ise :i i i I i : se Park?

ES:

¥''•-- z' '

uu. move t? West Valley?

ET:

I

1QQ

ES:

When did she move out here in West Valley, just today, last
night or night before or whatever, I don't know.

RE:

Where were her and her son staying before then?

ET:

Ah, 14 4• 5 Wes i: I D" 0 Nor tl i, Apartmen I: ; ::

:.::

9 ^r - . .) or 19 91 or whatever. •
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RE:

Why did they move out to you?

ET:

Cause they got kicked out of their apartments.

RE:

Why?

ET:

They, I don't know why, they just did, I don't know.

RE:

Who's Chuck?

ET:

She's Debbie's boyfriend. That's..,.

RE:

When did he get in town?

ET:

I think he came in a couple of three days ago.

RE:

Where's Debbie living?

ET:

With Suzie.

RE;

So she was staying in that house too?

ET:

Ya,

RE:

Trailer?

ET;

Ya.

RE;

So Chuck got here and he was staying in that back bedroom too?

ET:

I guess, I don't know.

RE:

When you shot him, is that the bedroom he was....

ET:

Ya-

RE:

And you did shoot him?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Why did you shoot him?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

I want you to think about this, Edgar. You shot Suzie first
with the .22.

I don't know. Just..-.
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ET:

Ya.

RE:

Then you shot Scotty.

ET:

Ya.

RE:

You went in the bedroom to shoot Chuck?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Tell me, describe what happened as you ah, did you turn on the
light?

ET:

No.

RE;

Could you see him pretty good?

ET:

I couldn't, I couldn't, I, I was, I just, I couldn't even see.
I couldn't see him, I just, actually I couldn't even see any
of them.

RE:

You said that you shot him in the throat.

ET:

I'm just a lucky shot.

RE;

Well you said you shot him in the throat, and how would you
know you shot him in the throat if you couldn't see him.

ET:

Ah, afterwards I turned on the light.

RE:

Did you ever turn the light back off?

ET:

Ya, I turned it off about six or seven times, maybe more than
that.

RE:

How many times did you shoot Chuck?

ET:

Twice.

RE:

Why did you shoot him the second time?

ET:

I just popped off two rounds.

RE:

Did you have a .38 or a .357?

ET:

.38.
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ES:

How many times did you shoot Scotty?

ET:

I don't know, about four I guess I don't know, at least he
claims.

RE:

Who claims?

ET:

Scotty.

RE:

When did you talk to Scotty?

ET:

He was still alive.

RE;

He was still alive?

ET;

Ya.

RE:

Why didn't you shoot him again?

ET:

I just couldn't handle it.

RE:
ET:

After you shot everybody, was the lights on in the trailer?
No, they was all off.
One, the one light, the one back
bedroom light was on.

RE:

That was your bedroom?

ET:

Ya, no the one this one.

RE:

The one Chuck was in?

ET:

No, the one in the hall.

RE;

Oh, the hall light?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Okay, Edgar what we'd like to do is kind of start back in the
evening and tell us what happened. What time did they move
into your house.

ET:

I don't remember?

ES:

Yesterday?

TAPED INTERVIEW
EDGAR TIEDEMANN
NOVEMBER 2, 1991
91-20773
PAGE 13

ET;

I think so,

ES:

Do you know what day of the week it was?

ET:

I don't have any idea.

RE:

Was it night time when they moved in or day light?

ET;

I don't even know.

RE:

Was everybody doing heroin in the house or was they just
sniffing with you?

ET:

No, Suzie and them and Debbie were using heroin and ah Scotty
was straight and, and ah, Chuck was drunk. I don't know if he
was intoxicated or what.

RE:

But he'd been drinking?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Everybody went to bed.

ET:

I just laid there and thought.

RE;

Where at?

ET:

My bedroom.

RE;

All by yourself?

ET;

Ya.

RE;

What did you think about?

ET:

I don't know what.

RE:

When you was in the back bedroom, Edgar, with the gun, why did
you have to go out and shoot them?

ET:

I don't have any idea.

RE:

Did you hear any voices?

ET:

I think so.

What did you do?

I love everyone.

I don't know.
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RE:

Who was telling you to go shoot them?

ET:

The devil.

RE;

Are you a christian man?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Do you go to church?

ET:

Ya, I got to.. .inaudible. . .don't go to church, but I became an
L.D.S. person. I smoke and drink.

RE

You was sitting in your back bedroom, where was Debbie at?

ET

She was in the second bedroom.

RE

With Chuck?

ET

Ya.

RE

You walked down the hall?

ET

Ah-huh.

RE

Was the TV on?

ET

No.

RE

Radio on?

ET

No.

RE

What happened?

ET

No.

RE

Okay, you walked in....

ET

... inaudible...was dim.

RE

Okay, you walked down....

ET

Ya.

RE

...your's standing over Suzie, what happened?

Was the lights on?

I had the one light on in the hallway.
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ET:

I don't know what happened.
just....

I can't figure it out.

I

RE:

Was the sheet over her head?

ET:

No.

RE;

Did you see her face?

ET:

Just barely.

RE;

Was her eyes open?

ET:

Ya, I don't know, I couldn't tell if her eyes were open or
not, I think she was talking about something, I don't know.

ES

Who was she talking to?

ET

Me.

RE

Was she pleading for her life?

ET

No.

RE

Did she see the gun?

ET

No.

RE

She didn't see the gun at all?

ET

No.

RE

What did you say to her before you shot her?

ET

I don't know.

RE

What did you say after you shot her?

ET

Nothing.

RE

Did she move?

ET

No.

RE

After you shot her, what did Scotty do?

Or blanket over her head?
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ET:

He got up and flipped, flipped over the covers and then I shot
him.

RE:

Where did you shoot him at?

ET:

I don't know, in the stomach or, I mean in the arms and stuff
like that.
I don't know, I couldn't see very good
. . .inaudible. . . I just pumped about, I think I pumped two .22
shells into him and two .,3 8 shells into him.

RE:

What side of the mattress was you standing when you shot him?
The kitchen side or the bedroom side of the mattress?

ET:

Bedroom side.

RE;

So how far away from you, how far away was Suzie when you shot
her?

ET:

Ah, there's a coffee table on the end so, I guess from the
coffee table to there.

RE

Did you aim?

ET

No, I only pulled the trigger.

RE

Just one time?

ET

Ya.

RE

And it was a lucky shot?

ET

Ya.

RE

I don't believe you.

ET

I don't know, I was just...

ES

Were you angry with Suzie?

ET

Ya.

ES

What were you angry at her for?

ET

Cause she ripped me off of six or seven thousand dollars.

RE

How did she rip you off?
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ET:

Well, I bought her that car for eight hundred. She was going
to get her husband sent to prison and she bought coke, I mean
heroin with a thousand dollars and then I got her out of jail
one time and she wasn't even in jail and that was three
hundred dollars, she got this ticket, Lee what's his name, Lee
Ward and Debbie Lee and they split it up and shot it up in
heroin and then ah, I got her, I got her an abortion and I
found out she'd been fixed, I knew she'd been fixed but I
mean, she didn't appreciate anything.

RE:

If you knew all this, why did you let her move in with you?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

If you knew that she ripped you off of that money, did you
ever ask her to pay you back?

ET:

No.

ES:

What were you hoping to gain by it?

ET:

I wanted to marry her. She kept promising me she was going to
marry me, marry me, marry me.

RE

Was you having a sexual relationship with her?

ET

Ya.

RE

How many, you said that she was a prostitute?

ET

Ya.

RE

How often did she go out on the streets?

ET

I don't know.

RE

Who was her pimp?

ET

I think it was Lee Ward.

RE

Lee Ward?

ET

Ya.

RE

Who's that?
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ET:

A Niger.

RE:

Where does he live?

ET:

I don't know his exact address, somewhere in 13th South,
between 13th South and 7th West or something like that.

RE

Have you ever met him?

ET

Ya.

RE

Did he know that she was living with you?

ET

I think so.

RE

What's your phone number in your house?

ET

It was, ah, 263-8853, but I had it disconnected.

RE

Why?

ET

Cause I didn't trust them people.

ES

What people?

ET

Chuck and them other peoples and stuff.

ES

When did you have it disconnected?

ET

Huh?

ES

When did you have it disconnected?

ET

The day they move in.

RE

Yesterday?

ET

Ya.

RE

How far away were you from Scott when you shot Scott?

ET

I was standing in the same place where I shot Suzie.

RE

Then you walked down the hall?

ET

Ya.
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RE:

Tell me?

ET:

I walked down the hall and I shot four rounds.

RE:

Was you shooting your right hand or left hand?

ET:

I had them in both hands. I had my .22 in my left hand and my
.38 in my left, my right hand.

RE:

Are you right handed or left handed?

ET:

Right handed.

ES:

You had your .22 in the left hand and your .38 in the right?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

After you shot him

ET:

I felt terrible.

RE:

...what did you do then?

ET:

I felt terrible.

RE:

I understand that, but what did you do then?
Chuck what did you do?

ET:

I'm not sure. I laid down, I don't know what happened then.
It was all a blur.

RE:

What did you say to Debbie?

ET:

I talked to her for about two or three hours.

RE:

Where at?

ET:

I don't know.

ES:

You say Scotty was still alive?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What was Scotty doing?

ET:

Laying there moaning.

After you shot

I talked to her for several, I don't know.
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ES:

How long?

ET:

All day.

RE:

Did Suzie have AIDS?

ET:

I don't think so, I don't know, I don't know. I mean I could,
I think I got it, I don't know if I got it or what, I don't,
that's not important.

RE:

What's that?

ET:

That's not important.

RE:

Okay.

ET:

Went to get some heroin.

RE:

For who?

ET:

Debbie.

RE:

Why her?

ET:

I don't know, I wanted to get some cocaine.

ES:

For who?

ET:

I don't know, from Tony or something like that, I don't know
their names ..inaudible...

ES:

Was that for you or for him?

ET:

I wanted the heroin for Debbie and the cocaine for me.

RE:

How much money did you have on you?

ET:

I didn't have any money.

ES:

Who had money then?

ET:

Debbie.

RE:

Did Debbie know you was going to kill these people?

ET:

No.

Where did you go after you left your house?

For you or for Debbie?
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RE:

How long did you ride around with Debbie?

ET:

Well, I'd say about an hour or two, I don't know how long.

ES: ^ ... inaudible...drugs?
ET:

No. I found a piece in Suzie's coat pocket, here, a piece of
heroin.

RE:

Is that Suzie's jacket?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Whose idea was it to go get drugs?

ET:

Debbie's?

RE:

Why didn't you shoot Debbie there?

ET:

I couldn't fucking handle it, I came to my senses.
know why....

ES:

If you came to your senses, how come you didn't call somebody
to help Scotty?

ET:

I don't know.

ES:

How old is Scotty?

ET:

I think he's 15.

ES:

How old's Suzie?

ET:

I think she's 33.

RE:

How old's Debbie?

ET:

I think she's 37.

ES:

Anything happy between you and Debbie?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What happened?

I don't

I don't know if I came to my senses or not.

I think Chuck's 44.
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ET:

Um, Debbie and Suzie would take turn sitting on my face and
fucking me,

ES:

When?

ET:

Oh, a couple of times or I don't know.

RE:

Last night?

ET:

Ah, I don't know.

RE:

Did you have ah, have sex with Debbie today?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Where at?

ET:

The front room, I mean on the hall.

RE:

After you shot them?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

After you shot Suzie, Scott and Chuck, you took Debbie in the
hallway and did she submit to you or did you rape her?

ET:

She submitted to me.

RE:

What, how did it happen?

ET:

Well I had her wash her pussy out real good and I ate her out
and then I fucked her.

ES:

Did she say anything to you?

RE:

Did she want it?

ET:

Ya, I think so.

RE:

What did she say?

ET:

She said it was real enjoyable.

RE:

When did she tell you that?

ET:

Just after we did it.

What did you say to her?
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ES:

Did you have your guns with you still?

ET:

I laid them down on the floor,

ES:

Did you have your guns with you when you made her clean
herself?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Where was sure when you told her to get up and clean herself?

ET:

What's this?

ES:

How did this come about? You Scott, you shot Chuck, how did
you come to talk with Debbie? What did she do?

ET:

What do you mean, what did she do.

ES:

After you shot Chuck, what did she do?
him, is that correct?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

So what does she do?

ET:

Not much, she came up and we talked for a while.

RE:

What did you talk about?

ET:

How much I loved Suzie.

RE:

Did she know that you just shot Suzie and Scott?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Was she crying?

ET:

No. She had a horrified look on her face.
from the heroin.

RE:

After you brought her out of the bedroom, you talked for a
while in the hallway?

ET:

No, she sat down on the couch and we talked for about two or
three hours.

She was in bed with

I think it's just
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ES:

On the couch next to Suzie?

ET:

No on the other couch.

ES:

What was Scott doing all this time?

ET:

Moaning.

ES:

So you talked for two or three hours and you had her get up
and go to the bathroom?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Did you go into the bathroom with her?

ET:

No, I just stood out in the hall.

ES:

Then what happened?
her?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

What was she wearing?

ET:

Ah, a yell, I mean a white terry cloth towel, or a terry cloth
robe or whatever it is.

RE:

Any panties?

ET:

No.

RE:

Bra?

ET:

No.

ES:

Was she wearing any clothes when she was in bed with Chuck?

ET:

No.

RE:

Why didn't you go back in your bedroom? Edgar? Why didn't
you take Debbie back into her bedroom?
Back into your
bedroom?

I left the door open.

Is that when you performed oral sex on

?JT: I don't know, I just, I didn't think Suzie was dead.
RE:

Okay.

Suzie was sleeping on the couch.

TAPED INTERVIEW
EDGAR TIEDEMANN
NOVEMBER 2, 1991
91-20773
PAGE 25

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Scott's sleeping on the floor. How come Suzie's not sleeping
in your bedroom with you?

ET:

She wouldn't do it.

RE:

She'd make love to you but she wouldn't sleep with you?

ET: No.
ES:

Did you have intercourse with her that night?

ET: No.
ES:

When was the last time you had intercourse with Suzie?

ET:

Two or three days ago. Me and, me and Debbie and Suzie did,
I ate Suzie's pussy and Debbie was sitting on my dick.

RE:

Do you always have a threesome?

ET:

Ya. Well most, a lot of times just Suzie. I like just Suzie
the best.

RE:

Why?

ET:

Cause I love her.

ES:

Do you tell her that?

ET:

Every fucking day and night.

ES:

What does she say?

ET:

She didn't seem to say nothing?

ES:

Did she laugh at you?

ET:

I don't know what she did.

ES:

Did she laugh at you?

ET:

No, I don't think she, I don't know if she did or what.
just....

She just....

She
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RE:

What did she say tonight or today that made you angry enough
to shoot her?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

What did she do to make you angered, that angered you?

ET:

I don't know, I have no idea, just.....

ES:

What made you have sexual relations with her sister after you
shot her?

ET:

I don't know what that was. I guess I was just horny, I don't
know.

RE:

Shooting those people get you excited?

ET:

No.

RE:

Did you have an erection after you shot them?

ET:

No.

ES:

When did you get the erection?

ET:

When I was eating Suzie out, I mean Debbie out.

ES:

Did you ever have a sexual relationship prior to police
officer finding you?

ET:

Huh?

ES:

Did you have sex with her anymore prior to the police catching
you? After you left your trailer?

ET:

No.

ES:

Where did you go?

ET:

We went to score some dope.

RE:

Who was driving?

ET:

Debbie.

ES:

What vehicle?
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ET:

Chuck's truck, I mean Chuck's car.

RE:

What kind of car is it?

ET:

I don't know, it's an Oldsmobile I think or something like
that.

RE:

Is them the clothes you was wearing last night?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

And the same clothes you had on after you had sex with Debbie?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What were you wearing when you shot Suzie?

ET:

These clothes here.

ES:

So you were fully dressed?

ET:

Ya, except for this jacket here. This jacket here we, I mean,
we picked it off, I mean it was on, all I had to do was, a
jacket, two jackets, I picked this one here.

RE:

Why did you pick that one?

ET:

She got the other one, Debbie got the other one.

RE:

Why didn't you grab your jacket?
I mean Suzie's.

ET:

... inaudible...

RE:

Okay.

ES:

Did you get any dope?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Where all did you go?

ET:

I don't know.

ES:

How many places did you go?

Why did you grab Debbie's?

You said no right?

...inaudible...
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ET:

We just kept driving around and looking for the dope, I mean
calling places. I couldn't get the phone numbers.

ES:

What was Debbie saying?

ET:

Huh?

ES:

What was Debbie saying?

ET:

Saying?

ES:

What did she say? How did you guys decide to go ahead and go?
Whose idea was that?

ET

Hers.

ES

She asked you to call medical?

ET

No, no.

ES

She asked you to call for help?

ET

No.

ES

Was Scotty still sitting there, laying there moaning?

ET

Ya.

ES

Was he moaning when you left?

ET

I think so.

ES

Which door did you go out of?

ET

That door.

ES

Did you leave it unlocked or did you lock it?

ET

I locked it I think.

ES

How does it lock?

ET

Just push the button in.

RE

Was the front door already locked?
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ET:

Ya.

RE:

What did Debbie say to you while you was riding around?

ET:

Well she said that we could go back and get it on and....

RE:

And what else?

ET:

I don't know just.

RE:

Edgar?

ET:

Huh?

RE:

I think it's time you start telling us the truth.

ET:

That's the truth.

ES:

Edgar?

ET:

What.

ES:

We think it's time you start telling us the truth. The whole
truth. I think what you're saying is, is close, but I think
there's some other things that you know that you're just not
telling us.

RE:

I think you're fantasizing about a few things here and what
we'd like you to do is tell us exactly what happened.
Truthfully.

ET:

That's what happened.

RE:

Why did you shoot Suzie?

ET:

I loved her.

RE:

What happened that you got so angered that you went into the
back bedroom, got a gun, walked up to the foot of the couch,
pulled the weapon up to your eye, took aim and shot her in the
head?

ET:

I didn't shoot her, I mean, I pulled it down like that, I just
•« •

RE:

Show me again.
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ET:

Like that.

RE:

Stand up and show me, I can't....

ES:

Stand up. Okay, I'm on the couch.
the gun that you shot Suzie with?

ET:

This one here.

ES:

That's your left hand, you had the .22?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

How many times did you squeeze the trigger?

ET:

Once.

ES:

What could you see?

ET:

I wasn't sure.

RE:

Is the .22 an automatic or a revolver?

ET:

An automatic.

ES:

... inaudible....

ET:

Huh?

ES:

... inaudible...is that from the stroke?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Edgar, why did you shoot Suzie.
If you loved her, you
wouldn't have shot her.
You've know her for ten years.
You've talked to her before, you've been able to talk problems
out before. What problem manifested itself tonight or today
or last night that gave you the impulse to kill her?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

Something had to turn you, what turned you?

ES:

You say you were talking to her when you walked up and at the
bottom of the couch. What was she saying to you?

Which hand did you have
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ET:

She was telling me I was disgusting.

RE:

Why?

ET:

I don't know.

ES:

Now tell us.

RE:

I'm going to talk to Debbie and Debbie's going to tell us her
side of the story, so I want you to tell ya, tell us your side
before we talk to her.

ET:

That is my side of the story.

RE;

Did you get that sexually aroused by killing those people that
you....

ET:

No.

ES:

Then why after killing the woman you love, do you have
intercourse with her sister?

ET:

Cause I liked Debbie second.

RE:

Edgar, start telling the truth.
There's something that
snapped in that trailer house, last night or early this
morning that made you kill Suzie.

ET:

I don't know what happened.

RE:

It wasn't the devil. You didn't hear voices. What happened?

ET:

I don't know.

ES:

When she said that you were disgusting, when did she say that?

ET:

She said, she said I was disgusting.

ES:

What was happening before that? She sat on the couch and
yelled down the hall? Is that disgusting?

ET:

No, she was laying there.

RE:

She called you what?

ET:

Tiede.

I love all women.

She called me ...inaudible...
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ES:

Is that a nickname?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What did she say?

ET:

She said you were disgusting.

ES:

What had you done?

ET;

Nothing.

ES:

Was this when you had the guns in your hand or before?

ET:

I had the guns in my hand.

ES:

Okay, something had to have happened as you walked down the
hall with two guns in your hand. Not one gun, two guns.
Something had to got happened for you to come from your
bedroom down the hall, two guns in your hand, point the gun at
Debbie, at Suzie and take a shot.

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

After you shot Suzie, did you do anything else to her?

ET:

No, I covered her up.

RE:

With the blanket?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What was she wearing?

ET:

I donft know.

RE:

Did she have any blankets on her?

ET:

I think so, I don't know.

RE:

Or did you just cover her head up?

ET:

Her whole, her whole body.

RE:

So she was laying on the couch with any covers on her when you
shot her?
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ET:

No, she was, she had covers down to her, down around here.

RE:

Down to her waist?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Did she have her bra on?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

Did she have clothing that covered her?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Did she sit up when you shot her?

ET:

No.

RE:

She was laying down?

ES:

Edgar, did you ask her to come in the hall before you shot
her?

ET:

No.

ES:

Had you asked her to come and sleep with you earlier?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What did she say?

ET:

Just telling me I was disgusting.

ES:

How did this conversation begin. They're doing heroin, Debbie
and Suzie are doing heroin, where are they doing their heroin?

ET:

Ah, sometimes my bathroom other times....

ES:

Where were they doing it this time?

ET:

I think they was using the bathroom over there because I,
seven, seven fifteen, fourth north and 740 East, Apartment C.

ES:

They were doing heroin before they got to your house?

RE:

Who with?
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ET:

I don't know.

RE:

With him?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

Is Debbie a prostitute, too?

ET:

I think so.

ES:

So you asked Suzie to sleep with you and she called you
disgusting?

ET

Ya, I guess so.

ES

Well no, is it true or not?

ET

I thinks it is.

ES

Okay, I'm just telling you what you told me.

ET

Ya.

RE

Edgar?

ET

Huh?

RE

Why did you shoot them?

ET

I don't know.

RE

Why did you shoot Scotty and Chuck then?

ET

I don't know.

RE

Have we made any threats to you during this interview?

ET

No.

RE

Have we promised you anything?

ET

No.

RE

Are you making this statement on your own free will?

ET

Ya.

I just, I don't know.
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RE:

Is there anything else that you can tell us in your defense?
Is there anything that you want to tell us to help us?

ET:

I don't want to make any appeals and I want to be put to death
by lethal injection.

RE:

You know you're going to be charged with a capital homicide?

ET:

I know.

RE:

Why did you do it?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

Are you under any influence of any other drugs or alcohol?

ET:

Just toluene.

RE:

How do you feel?

ET:

Lousy.

RE:

Okay, do you u n d e r s t a n d e v e r y t h i n g I ' v e s a i d ?

ET:

Sometimes.

RE:

You've made a response to everything I've asked you, is that
correct?

ET:

I think so.

RE:

Do you have anything else to say?

ET:

I'll think of something in a while,

RE:

Okay, we're going to conclude this interview, same date at
3:00 PM\
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 021912452

:

EDGAR TIEDEMANN,

:

Defendant.

:

This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to
Suppress Illegally Obtained Statements.

The Motion raises three

legal issues. First, whether defendant invoked his Miranda
second,

whether

defendant's

confession

was

rights;

involuntary;

and

finally, whether defendant was competent during his interrogation.
FACTS
Detective Ron Edwards ("Det. Edwards") and Sergeant Ed Spann
(MSgt. Spann") of the West Valley Police Department, began the
interrogation of defendant, Edgar Tiedemann, on November 2, 1991,
at 1:58 p.m.

Det. Edwards began by asking the defendant to sign

the paper placed before him and explained for the benefit of the
camera and the defendant that defendant had received his
rights and was not intoxicated.

Miranda

The defendant corrected Det.

Edwards, stating that he was intoxicated on Toluene.

Det. Edwards

asked the defendant how long he had been intoxicated on Toluene and
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the defendant responded, stating "since 1962."
was

incapable

of

understanding

or

When asked if he

answering

questions,

the

defendant responded, "Sometimes, I don't know." At this point, the
tape stopped and started again at 2:13 p.m.
Det. Edwards read the defendant his Miranda

rights.

The

defendant said that he was intoxicated on Toluene and confirmed
that he was willing to answer questions with the police and did so
voluntarily.

The defendant continued the interrogation with his

head lowered, and he infrequently looked up into the camera.
When Det. Edwards asked, "What happened to her (Suzie)?" the
defendant said, "I don't want to talk about it."

Immediately

afterward, when asked, "What don't you want to talk about?" he
remained silent.

Immediately thereafter, when asked, "Who is

Suzie?" he responded without delay, "The woman that I love." The
defendant

readily

answered

other

questions

throughout

the

interrogation, except when asked, "What happened to Suzie?"
The defendant did not remember the day of the week even though
Det. Edwards told him the date at the beginning of the interview,
and he did not remember if the victims moved in his house during
the day or night.

The defendant did provide several complex

answers during the interrogation, including the license number and
make of his car, the year he had his stroke, the physical effects
of his stroke and other detailed information.
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When responding to Det. Edwards' question if he had any mental
problems, the defendant said "Ya.

All kinds.

See, I think I'm

Adolph Hitler. Adolph Hitler died in May of 1945 and I was born in
19, October 194 6. I think I'm Adolph Hitler." When asked by Det.
Edwards if he heard voices, the defendant stated, "I think so. I
don't know."

When asked by Det. Edwards who was telling him to

shoot them, the defendant responded, "the devil."

The defendant

also responded that he was a religious person.
The defendant's interview ended at 2:58 p.m., having lasted
just under one hour.

During the interview, he did not request a

break, did not directly request to stop the interview or request to
have an attorney present.
ANALYSIS
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.1" Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 163 (1986) .

A defendant in custody has the right to

remain silent, the right to have an attorney present and the right
to stop an interrogation at any time. Miranda v. Arizona. 3 84 U.S.
436 (1964).

Under the Due Process Clause, "certain interrogation

techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique
characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a
civilized system of justice that they must be condemned."

Id.
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"Voluntariness" is not the sole consideration when considering
whether admission of a confession violates the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.

State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Utah 1999).

"Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not "voluntary.1" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
Analysis of whether a confession is admissible must consider the
"totality of circumstances" to determine if the confession was
"made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of
any sort."
"totality

Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689 (1993).
of

the

circumstances"
the

accused

takes
and

into account
the

details

The

"both the

characteristics

of

of

the

interrogation."

State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989).

"Courts must consider such external factors as the duration of the
interrogation, the persistence of the officers, police trickery,
absence of family and counsel , and threats and promises made to the
defendant by the officers."

Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1013.

"Courts must also consider such factors as the defendant's
mental health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education,
age,

and familiarity with the judicial system."

Id. at 1014.

Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court states, "a defendant's mental
condition

is

not

in

itself

sufficient

to

make

a

confession

involuntary."

Id.

The mental state of a defendant "is relevant to
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the extent it made him more susceptible to mentally coercive police
tactics."

Id.

The court sets forth objective and subjective factors that a
court

should

consider

when

circumstances" examination.

conducting
Id.

a

at 1015.

"totality

of

the

Objective factors

include police misrepresentation, the false friend technique,
threats and promises and other factors such as "whether the
defendant is subject to extended periods of incommunicado." Jd. at
1015-1018.

In explaining subjective factors, the court lists

whether the interrogators deny any of the defendant's requests,
whether the defendant had prior experience with the judicial
system, whether the defendant

was particularly vulnerable to

psychological manipulation, or whether the defendant was more
susceptible to stress and coercion than the average person. Id. at
1019-1020.
I. Violation of Miranda
The defense argues the defendant affirmatively invoked his
right to remain silent, and that right was violated when police
detectives continued his interrogation. The defendant cites State
v. Guiterrez, 864 P.2d 894, 897 (Utah App. 1993), to show that an
effective initial waiver of the right to remain silent does not
nullify a suspect's ability to subsequently invoke this right
during the course of an interrogation.

In Guiterrez, when the
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defendant said, "I ain't going to say nothing," the Utah Court of
Appeals found the defendant invoked his Miranda

rights.

id.

In

Guiterrez, with continued questions and the police interrogator's
suggestion that he was only using self-defense, the defendant was
provoked into a confession.

Jd.

Guiterrez is distinguishable

because the interrogators were more forceful and suggestive in
their questioning and the defendant was referring to the entire
interview, not a particular question.
Here, the defendant did not want to talk about the specific
bodily harm to Suzie, but was otherwise cooperative and willing to
talk to the interrogators.

The defendant answered affirmatively

that he understood his Miranda

rights, he refused to answer

questions regarding the bodily harm that was inflicted upon Suzie,
but unhesitatingly answered all other questions.

His purposeful

silence lasted only a brief period of time and only to questions
regarding bodily injury to Suzie.

He did not indicate, at any

time, that he wished to stop the interrogation.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant did not invoke
his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Court need not reach the issue
of whether the defendant's statements are still admissible for
purposes of impeachment.

II.
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Involuntary Statements

The defense argues that the defendant's statements were not
made voluntarily,

in violation of federal due process.

In

analyzing whether the defendant's confession is voluntary, the
Court will address both the objective and subjective factors of the
defendant's interrogation.
a.

Police Misrepresentation, False Friend Technique, Threats

or Promises and Other Objective Factors
The defense argues the defendant's interrogation was subject
to police coercion due to questionable interrogation techniques.
Specifically, the defense cites Rettenberger to show the use of
false friend technique, mental coercion, the lack of presence of
counsel, family or friends.

984 P. 2d at 1013.

Rettenberger is

clearly distinguishable in that the police coercion was much more
extensive.

Here, the interrogators did not make use of false

statements or half-truths.

They did not use the false friend

technique by implying they were acting in the best interest of the
defendant by the simple use of his first name. The detectives did
not use any threats or promises to entice the defendant into a
confession.

The entire interrogation took place within one hour,

and during the investigation the interrogators did not deny any
special requests of the defendant.

There is no evidence of any

ethical misconduct by the police. In short, the record shows that
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the detective!s interrogation was absent of suggestive and coercive
techniques.
method

The Court finds no reason to believe the interrogation

used

techniques

that

were

sufficient

to

render

Make

Defendant

the

defendant's confession involuntary.
b.

Subjective

Factors

That

the

More

Susceptible to Manipulation
Turning to a review of the subjective factors that may make
the defendant more susceptible to manipulation is a more difficult
process than reviewing for pclice misconduct.

The defense argues

that the defendant's diminished mental capacity, the influence of
drugs, his references to Hitler and Satan, and his lack of verbal
skills and ability to express himself deem the defendant incapable
of a voluntary confession.
The

defendant's

prolonged

use

of

Toluene,

the

stroke

he

suffered in 1982, or a head injury received as a child might be the
cause

of

his

generalized

cerebral

damage

resulting

impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q.
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, p. 14.)

in

severe

(Memorandum in
The defendant's

reference that he believes he is Adolph Hitler indicates that he
knows Hitler is dead and he does not have an actual belief that he
is Hitler.
criminal

act

His reference to Satan telling him to commit the
may

also

stem

from

his

religious

beliefs.

"A

perception of coercion flowing from the "voice of God1 is a matter
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to which the Federal Constitution does not speak."

Connelly, 479

U.S. at 517. In reviewing defendant's interrogation it is evident
he did not answer all questions intelligently.

On the other hand,

the defendant provided clear and detailed answers to many of the
questions.
III.

Incompetent
The

defense

argues

that

the defendant

was

incompetent,

rendering him incapable of voluntarily and knowingly waiving his
constitutional rights at the time of his interrogation.

The

defense cites Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960), where
the Supreme Court held the defendant's confession involuntary and
reversed the conviction. There the defendant had a long history of
mental illness, was interrogated for eight to nine hours in a small
room filled with police officers with no relatives or counsel
present and his confession was written by a police officer.

The

court found that the defendant was "insane" before, during and
after the robbery.

At the time of the robbery he was absent

without authorization from a mental ward, where he had been placed
due

to

his

Veteran1s

Administration

classification

of 100%

incompetence resulting from a diagnosis of "schizophrenic reactive,
paranoid type." Id. at 201. The factors addressed by the court in
Blackburn are not present in the instant case.

Prior to his

interrogation,

defendant
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had

not

been

found

incompetent

or

"insane," and similar coercive factors were absent.
Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's

interrogation,

including

his

treatment

by

the

detectives and his mental state, the Court finds his confession did
not violate his Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
admissible.

The Motion to Suppress is denied.

rights and is
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 021912452

:

EDGAR TIEDEMANN,
Defendant.

:
:

This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Quash
Count

III, or, Alternatively,

Motion to Amend

Count

III, and

defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on Destruction of Exculpatory
Evidence.

This Court has reviewed the Memoranda of counsel and

heard oral argument on these Motions.
I,

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH COUNT III, OR ALTERNATIVELY

MOTION TO AMEND COUNT III
Defendant argues that Count III of the Information, the count
that alleges Murder of Scott Liam Bunnell, Jr., should be dismissed
because the State failed to show probable cause at the preliminary
hearing.

At the preliminary hearing, Deborah Southerland Pryor

testified that on the evening in question she was in the bedroom of
defendant's trailer when he came in, shot several times into the
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She heard several shots fired

in the front room, and subsequently went out to the front room and
observed Mr. Bunnell's injuries.

In addition, the State submitted

an autopsy by Dr. Edward Leis, completed after Mr. Bunnell's death
in 2001.

The autopsy concluded that Mr. Bunnell had died from

complications of paraplegia caused by the gunshot wound inflicted
by defendant.
At

a

preliminary

hearing

"the

prosecution

must

present

sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense
has been committed and that the defendant committed it."
Clark, 20 P.3d 300

(Ut^h 2001).

State v.

At a preliminary hearing "the

magistrate must view all evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the prosecution."
2 000) .

State v. Hester, 3 P. 3d 725, 728

(Utah App.

This Court finds that evidence produced by the State at

preliminary hearing was sufficient to bind over Count III.

In the

alternative, the defendant has moved the Court to amend Count III
to Attempted Homicide.
evidence

to bind

over

Having
Count

found that there is sufficient

III on

the greater

alternative Motion need not be addressed.
Motion is denied.

offense,

the

Therefore, defendant's
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II, MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON DESTRUCTION OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
Defendant has moved this Court to dismiss the charges against
him based on the State's "willful destruction of all potentially
exculpatory evidence.''
Defendant argues that the destruction of the evidence is in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution

and Article

I, Section 12, of the Utah

Constitution.
In 1991, defendant was charged with two counts of Aggravated
Murder, one count of Attempted Aggravated Murder, one count of
Aggravated Kidnapping, and one Count of Aggravated Sexual Assault.
All charges were dismissed on June 11, 1992, after defendant was
found incompetent to stand trial. After that time, numerous items,
including handguns, ballistic evidence, "Code R" data, blood and
tissue samples, gunshot residue tests, fingerprints, drugs and
paraphernalia, and clothing and bedding items were destroyed.
These items were destroyed sometime between 1993 and 1994.

In

2002, defendant was found competent to stand trial and charges were
re-filed.

Defendant is now charged with three counts of Criminal

Homicide, Murder, all first degree felonies.
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Under federal law, a defendant's due process rights are
violated if evidence destroyed has "exculpatory value that was
apparent before the evidence was destroyed and [is] of such nature
that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by
other reasonably available means."
U.S. 479, 489

(1984) .

California v. Trombetta, 467

The destroyed evidence also must be

material, and "the possibility that the
exculpated

[evidence] could have

[defendant] if preserved or tested is not enough to

satisfy the standard of constitutional materiality."
Younablood,

488

U.S.

51, 58

(1988).

If

Arizona v.

evidence

is only

potentially useful, defendant bears the burden to show that police
acted in bad faith in not preserving the evidence.

Icl.

"Bad

faith requires that a defendant prove more than mere negligence; a
defendant must show that 'the police...by their conduct indicate
that

the

evidence

defendant.'"

could

form

a

basis

for

exonerating

the

State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah App. 1988)

(quoting Youngblood, at 109).
Defendant asserts that "bad faith should be presumed in this
case

unless

and

until

the

government

is

able

explanation for the destruction of this evidence."

to

offer

an

Defendant's

Memorandum at pp. 6-7. Defendant misstates the legal requirement.
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the burden is upon the defendant to show that the

State acted in bad faith in destroying the aforementioned property.
The defendant has failed to meet that burden.
Defendant further argues that under the Utah Constitution,
Article I, Section 12, defendant is afforded a higher degree of
protection than under the Federal Constitution.

The State argues

that defendant's argument lacks merit because Utah has adopted the
United States Supreme Court's standard.

This Court cannot find

support for the State's argument. Both cases cited by the State in
support, State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999), and State v.
Holden, 964 P.2d 318

(Utah App. 1998), were based on the state

courts adhering to federal precedent when issues are argued under
the Federal Constitution.
appellate

Defendant correctly notes that Utah

courts on occasion have been willing

to consider a

different interpretation of Utah Constitution, Article I, Section
14, than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
addressing the matter of search and seizure.
Court

has

stated,

"choosing

to give

The Utah Supreme

the Utah

Constitution

a

somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate
method for insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the
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State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (1990), (quoting

State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, at n.8 (Utah 1988)).
In State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73, n. 5 (Utah App.
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals suggested a three-prong analysis
in determining whether the Utah Constitution should be interpreted
differently

from

Constitution.

a

similar

provision

in

the

United

States

First, the moving party should analyze the "unique

context in which Utah's Constitution developed", second, "should
demonstrate the willingness of state appellate courts to regularly
interpret textually similar state constitution provisions in a
manner different from federal interpretation of'the United States
Constitution, and that it is entirely proper to do so in the
federal system," and third, the moving party should cite to "other
states supporting the particular construction urged by counsel."
Id.
In the instant
concerning

the

case, defendant

unique

context

in

has offered no analysis
which

Utah's

Constitution

developed, nor shown why this State's Constitution should be
interpreted differently than the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution.
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In addition, defendant has made reference to numerous cases in
other

state

jurisdictions

that

have

"rejected

Youngblood".

However, defendant has not articulated the rulings of other states
correctly.

For example, in

State v. Morales , 657 A.2d 585, 594

(Conn. 1995), the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded:
That the good or bad faith of the police in failing to
preserve
potentially
useful
evidence
cannot
be
dispositive of whether a criminal defendant has been
deprived of due process of law. Accordingly, we, too,
reject the litmus test of bad faith on the part of police
which the United States Supreme Court adopted under the
Federal Constitution and Youngblood.
Rather, in
determining whether a defendant has been afforded due
process of law under the state constitution, the trial
court must employ. .. [a] balancing test, weighing the
reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against
the degree of prejudice to the accused.
More
specifically, the trial court must balance the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the missing evidence,
including the following factors:
The materiality of
missing
evidence,
the
likelihood
of
mistaken
interpretation of it by witnesses or the jury, the reason
for its nonavailability to the defense, and the prejudice
to the defendant caused by the unavailability of the
evidence.
(Quoting
State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227
(1984)) .
In the instant case, defendant has only urged this Court to
reject the bad faith Youngblood standard, but he has not suggested
a viable alternative standard.
Because defendant has failed to offer a Utah Constitutional
Dasis, nor a viable alternative to Youngblood based on the Utah
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Constitution,

this

PAGE 8
Court

cannot
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appropriately

address

the

constitutional issue. Therefore, this Court finds defendant's Utah
Constitutional argument inadequate.
Accordingly, having found no United States Constitutional
basis

nor

Utah

Constitutional

basis

to

dismiss

this

case,

defendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon destruction of exculpatory
evidence is denied.
Dated this

/f day of September, 2005.
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